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Civil war declaration: On April 14th and 15th, 2012 Federal Republic of Germany "_urkenstaats"s parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, received a antifiscal written civil war declaration by Federal Republic of Germany "Rechtsstaat"s electronic resistance for human rights even though the "Widerstandsfall" according to article 20 paragraph 4 of the constitution, the "Grundgesetz", had been already declared in the years 2001-03. more
REDE
12. Juni 2025
Finanzintegration vorantreiben
Die Vollendung des Binnenmarkts, der Bankenunion und der Kapitalmarktunion ist für Widerstandsfähigkeit und Wachstum unerlässlich. Nun ist es an der Zeit, in allen drei Bereichen entschieden zu handeln, so Vizepräsident Luis de Guindos bei einer EU-Konferenz zur europäischen Finanzintegration.
Rede
REDE
11. Juni 2025
Der Anleihemarkt im Euroraum
Chefvolkswirt Philip R. Lane erläutert die jüngsten geldpolitischen Beschlüsse der EZB, die aktuellen Besonderheiten des Anleihemarkts im Euroraum und einige Innovationen, die den Spielraum für die Nutzung von auf Euro lautenden Anleihen als sichere Anlagen erweitern könnten.
Rede
PUBLIKATION
11. Juni 2025
Die internationale Rolle des Euro
Laut unserem aktuellen Bericht ist der Euro weiterhin die zweitwichtigste Währung der Welt. Um seine Rolle weiter zu stärken, müssen wir Fortschritte bei der Spar- und Investitionsunion, beim digitalen Euro und bei grenzüberschreitenden Zahlungen machen. Zugleich muss die Rechtsstaatlichkeit gewahrt bleiben.
Bericht- 12 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 12 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASERelated
- 25 June 2024
- PAGEEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (23) +
- 11 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASERelated
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO
- 11 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 11 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 12 June 2025
- Keynote speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the annual Joint Conference of the European Commission and the European Central Bank on European financial integration
- 12 June 2025
- Slides by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the House of the Euro in Brussels, Belgium
- 11 June 2025
- Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Government Borrowers Forum 2025
- 11 June 2025
- Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the People’s Bank of China in Beijing
- 9 June 2025
- Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Italian constitutional court
- 27 May 2025
- Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel on 20 May 2025
- 27 May 2025
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Leonidas Stergiou on 21 May 2025
- 18 May 2025
- Interview with Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, conducted by Marie-Pierre Gröndahl on 8 May 2025
- 3 May 2025
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Jakob Zirm on 28 April 2025
- 24 March 2025
- Interview with Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Andrés Stumpf
- 10 June 2025
- Geopolitical tensions and trade policy uncertainty are injecting unpredictability into global financial markets. What seems like rock-solid market sentiment today can turn into jitters tomorrow. In this ECB Blog, we present a new risk appetite indicator to systematically track such shifts in market sentiment.Details
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 28 May 2025
- Despite recent ECB rate cuts, the average interest rate on mortgages is expected to increase further. This is because of lagged effects from the latest hiking cycle. The ECB blog shows that the resulting drag on consumption could last at least until 2030.Details
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 23 May 2025
- The degradation of natural ecosystems slows growth and leads to financial instability. Water scarcity, natural flood protection and water quality are most critical. Surface water scarcity alone puts almost 15% of the euro area’s economic output at risk.Details
- JEL Code
- Q50 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→General
- 8 May 2025
- Foreign workers play an increasingly important role in the euro area labour markets. This ECB blog analyses the effects migrants had on growth across the largest countries in recent years. It also discusses changing labour market participation patterns among foreign workers.Details
- JEL Code
- J10 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→General
- 5 May 2025
- Lasting high energy prices are putting pressure on industries across Europe. This is hitting some regions, such as southern Germany, the Ruhr and northern Italy, harder than others. The ECB Blog examines the implications for employment.Details
- JEL Code
- J60 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→General
Q40 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→General
- 12 June 2025
- AMI-SECO REPORT
- 12 June 2025
- CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
- 12 June 2025
- CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
- 11 June 2025
- CONSULTATION RESPONSE
- 11 June 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3061Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of cyclical systemic risks on banks’ profitability in the euro area within a panel quantile regression model, with the ultimate goal to inform the calibration of the Countercyclical Capital buffer (CCyB). Compared to previous studies, we augment our model to control for unobserved bank-specific characteristics and year-fixed effects and find a lower degree of heterogeneity in the estimated effects across the conditional distribution of bank returns on assets. We propose a simple yet intuitive framework to calibrate the CCyB through the cycle, including the socalled "positive neutral" rate. The model suggests a target positive neutral rate for the euro area ranging from 1.1% to 1.8%. Furthermore, the calibrated CCyB rates are consistent with the evolution of domestic cyclical systemic risks in the countries considered. The results further show that the adoption of a positive neutral CCyB approach allows for an earlier and more gradual build-up of the buffer, but does not lead to higher CCyB requirements at the peak of the cycle. Importantly, a positive neutral CCyB strategy would have implied that most euro area countries would have had a positive CCyB in place at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 11 June 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3060Details
- Abstract
- This study examines how dismantling Mafia-connected firms affects banks’ lending practices. Using a unique dataset of 667 such firms and loan-level data from the European Central Bank, our analysis shows that anti-Mafia operations precede an increase in bank loans to businesses that operate in areas that are directly affected by these actions. Specifically, overall loan volumes increase by approximately 0.8 percent, which translates to an increase of €1.38 billion in bank loans to these firms. The effect increases to 1.2 percent in areas that have experienced extensive Mafia activities, amounting to €2.76 billion in bank loans, and to 2.1 percent in areas that were once dominated by Mafia-connected firms that were engaged in rent extraction, amounting to €3.62 billion in bank loans. Borrowing costs rise concurrently, driven by heightened perceptions of risk following exposure of Mafia infiltration. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that banks’ responses vary significantly because non-local and foreign banks and banks with no prior exposure to Mafia-affiliated firms face increased challenges related to their lack of local knowledge. Removal of Mafia-connected firms also correlates with improved productivity in affected municipalities, underscoring financial institutions’ dynamic responses to the eradication of organized crime and the potential for economic revitalization in post-Mafia environments.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO - SPECIAL FEATUREThe international role of the euro 2025Details
- Abstract
- This special feature uses new data collected by ECB and IMF staff from over 120 countries to examine trends in global trade invoicing currency patterns up to 2023. The analysis reveals several key insights: the US dollar and the euro remain the most prominent primary invoicing currencies, together accounting for over 80% of global trade invoicing. While the US dollar serves as a global vehicle currency, the euro's role as a vehicle currency is particularly significant in Europe and parts of Africa. Despite some growth, the renminbi's share in global trade invoicing remains very low, at less than 2%, although it is increasing in the Asia-Pacific region and in some parts of Europe. Finally, this special feature presents some evidence of a relationship between shifts in invoicing currency patterns and geopolitical alignment, especially since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This evidence is most marked for certain countries which have distanced themselves geopolitically from the West, such as Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where the share of exports invoiced in the US dollars and euro was 10-50 percentage points lower in 2023 than in 2015-19.
- JEL Code
- F14, F31, F44 : International Economics→Trade→Empirical Studies of Trade
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO - SPECIAL FEATUREThe international role of the euro 2025Details
- Abstract
- This special feature uses granular data from the ECB’s Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS) to investigate whether foreign holdings of euro area securities react to geopolitics. Where similar information is available from the US Treasury, a comparison is made with respect to foreign holdings of US Treasury securities. The analysis reveals several key insights. First, foreign investors hold almost a quarter of both euro area and US government debt. While these total foreign holdings are concentrated in countries geopolitically aligned with the West, foreign official sector holdings of euro area government debt are mainly held by non-aligned countries. Second, official foreign investors’ holdings of euro area government debt have remained generally resilient since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The decline in holdings of countries (excluding Russia) that are not geopolitically aligned with the West, which have dropped by 5% relative to pre-invasion levels, has so far been contained, highlighting the importance of upholding the rule of law. Econometric estimates suggest that geopolitical non-alignment explains at least part of this decline. These patterns still hold, even after correcting for geographic biases in international financial statistics to the extent possible. As the decline is small, the impact on euro area bond yields has been very limited thus far.
- JEL Code
- F30, F60 : International Economics→International Finance→General
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO - BOXThe international role of the euro 2025Details
- Abstract
- Payments play a critical role in the global economy, with cross-border transactions largely processed through correspondent banking networks, which are often slow and costly. Fast payment systems (FPS) have emerged to address these inefficiencies, settling transactions in seconds. However, global FPS connections remain fragmented, concentrated in regional clusters, with limited interoperability due to economic, technical, and geopolitical barriers. Geopolitical tensions significantly impact the likelihood of interlinking FPS, potentially reducing connections and increasing trade costs. To mitigate fragmentation risks, initiatives like the G20 roadmap and the ECB's exploration of interlinking TIPS with other FPS aim to enhance the global payment infrastructure.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO - BOXThe international role of the euro 2025Details
- Abstract
- The Box examines the borrowing behaviour of US firms that issue euro-denominated bonds, commonly referred to as "Reverse Yankees," and explores the factors influencing their choice of issuance currency, including the risk-free rate differentials between the US and euro area, credit spreads, and the cost of hedging foreign exchange risk. Empirical evidence suggests that both declining hedged and unhedged borrowing costs in euro provide an incentive for US firms to issue more Reverse Yankee bonds. Changes in expected borrowing costs play an important role for the euro’s appeal as an international funding currency.
- JEL Code
- F31 : International Economics→International Finance→Foreign Exchange
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO - BOXThe international role of the euro 2025Details
- Abstract
- The box examines gold demand by the official sector and its relationship to geopolitics. In 2024, gold prices reached historical highs while central banks accounted for over 20% of global gold demand in 2024, in contrast to around one-tenth in the 2010s. Empirical evidence suggests that both diversification and geopolitical hedging purposes drive central banks’ demand for gold.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F31 : International Economics→International Finance→Foreign Exchange
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F51 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Conflicts, Negotiations, Sanctions
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EUROAnnexes
- 11 June 2025
- THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO
Related- 11 June 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 10 June 2025
- EURO AREA QUARTERLY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS - QUALITY REPORT
- 10 June 2025
- SURVEY OF MONETARY ANALYSTS - AGGREGATE RESULTS
- 5 June 2025
- MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE EURO AREAEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (21) +Annexes
- 5 June 2025
- MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE EURO AREA
- 4 June 2025
- CONVERGENCE REPORTAnnexes
- 4 June 2025
- CONVERGENCE REPORT
- 27 May 2025
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 131Details
- Abstract
- This article studies the supply of private safe assets by banks and its implications for financial stability. Banks originate loans and improve loan quality through hidden screening efforts. They can then create safe assets by issuing debt backed by the safe payoffs, from both loans they have originated and a diversified pool of loans from other banks. The interaction between banks’ screening efforts and diversification decisions determines the volume of safe assets they supply. In the context of incomplete markets, a free-rider problem arises: individual banks fail to internalise how their efforts influence the ability to generate safe assets through diversification, as this depends on the collective efforts of all banks. This market failure creates a novel inefficiency, which worsens as the scarcity of safe assets increases, leading to a backward-bending safe asset supply curve. The public provision of safe assets helps mitigate the inefficiency by reducing their scarcity, but it cannot fully solve the problem. Moreover, the impact on the total private supply of safe assets is ambiguous: public safe assets reduce incentives for diversification (a “crowding-out” effect), which in turn increases banks’ incentives to exert screening effort (a “crowding-in” effect).
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 21 May 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3059Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides the first study of climate risk pricing in euro area commercial real estate markets. We pay particular attention to changes in risk pricing over time, as a sudden market shift may significantly amplify the financial stability and macroeconomic implications of these risks. We find evidence of investors applying a penalty to buildings exposed to physical risk and that this penalty has increased significantly over the 2007-2023 period we study, particularly for properties exposed to risks associated with climate change. This change in pricing appears to have occurred in an orderly manner, with no implications for liquidity in the market for high risk buildings. In contrast, while pricing of transition risk has also increased over the period studied, towards the end of our sample the market response to transition risk appears to be playing out via market liquidity. This indicates that older buildings - which are more exposed to transition risks - may already be at risk of becoming “stranded assets”.
- JEL Code
- R33 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Nonagricultural and Nonresidential Real Estate Markets
Q51 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Valuation of Environmental Effects
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
- 21 May 2025
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEWAnnexes
- 21 May 2025
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW
Related- 21 May 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 21 May 2025
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2025Details
- Abstract
- This box examines the decline in the share of non-banks’ liquid asset holdings and the implications of this for financial stability. In recent years, the share of cash equivalents and HQLA Level 1 holdings has significantly decreased, which may reduce the ability of non-banks to absorb shocks and meet payment obligations, especially under stressed market conditions. Valuation losses on HQLA Level 1 bonds, higher valuation gains on HQLA Level 2 equities and increased investment in less liquid assets have been the key drivers of this decline. Additionally, not all HQLAs retain their liquidity in times of stress. The growing share of HQLA Level 2 assets primarily consists of traded equities, which can suffer sharp valuation losses during periods of market stress and it may only be possible to liquidate them at a significant discount. Furthermore, growing non-bank reliance on indirect exposure to liquid assets via holdings of investment fund shares introduces additional risks, as their liquidity may be uncertain in stress periods. This creates the potential for financial contagion across non-bank financial intermediation sectors, highlighting the need for closer monitoring of liquidity risk and its broader systemic implications.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
Zinssätze
| Einlagefazilität | 2,00 % |
| Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte (fester Zinssatz) | 2,15 % |
| Spitzenrefinanzierungsfazilität | 2,40 % |
Inflationsrate
Mehr zur InflationWechselkurse
| USD | US dollar | 1.1433 | |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 166.17 | |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0.84760 | |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 0.9405 |
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