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Melina Papoutsi

Research

Division

Financial Research

Current Position

Senior Economist

Fields of interest

Financial Economics

Email

Melina.Papoutsi@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2013-2018

PhD in Finance and Economics, Columbia University, New York, United States

2010-2011

MA in International and Development Economics, Yale University, New Haven, United States

2005-2009

BSc in Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

Professional experience
2018-2020

Economist - Monetary Policy Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank

2011-2013

Associate - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, The World Bank, Washington D.C., United States

Awards
2017

Outstanding PhD Student Paper, Fordham Gabelli School of Business

2017

Doctoral Fellowship, Arora - Naldi

2017

Best PhD Paper Award, Columbia Business School, Finance Division

2017

Best Finance PhD Paper Award, Washington University in St.Louis WFA-CFAR

2016

Doctoral Fellowship, Deming Center

2013

Doctoral Fellowship, Alexander S. Onassis Foundation

2010

Fellowship, Fulbright Foundation

15 June 2022
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 96
Details
Abstract
While historically only very large firms issued in the European corporate bond market, recent years have seen the entry of many new players: small, private, and unrated issuers. Firm-level data show these new players face different game dynamics. They are disconnected from aggregate market movements and still depend heavily on banks. This means hey could potentially affect financial stability and be less responsive to policy interventions.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
19 May 2022
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2663
Details
Abstract
Using large panel data of public and private firms, this paper dissects the growth of bond financing in the Euro Area through the lens of the cross-section of issuers. In recent years, the composition of bond issuers has shifted, with the entry of many smaller and riskier issuers. New issuers invest and grow, instead of simply repaying bank loans. Moreover, holdings of ‘buy-and-hold’ bond investors are large in aggregate but small for weaker issuers. Nevertheless, the bond investors’ sell-off after March 2020 was largely directed at bonds of larger, safer issuers. This micro-evidence can shed light on the implications of corporate bonds market development for smaller firms and financial stability.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
18 May 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2553
Details
Abstract
This paper presents evidence that personal relationships between corporate borrowers and bank loan officers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiation. Analysing a bank reorganization in Greece in the mid-2010s, I find that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship confront three consequences: one, the firms are less likely to renegotiate their loans; two, conditional on renegotiation, the firms are given tougher loan terms; and three, the firms are more likely to alter their capital structure. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers in loan renegotiations.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
25 February 2021
RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 81
Details
Abstract
Loan renegotiations are expected to surge following the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak and the subsequent crisis, as more loans default during recessions. At such times, managing lending relationships effectively becomes even more important for bank governance, risk, and credit supply. My study presents evidence that continuous lending relationships between bank loan officers and corporate borrowers improve the outcomes of loan renegotiations. The analysis draws on a novel dataset on corporate loans during a bank reorganisation in Greece in the mid-2010s. This dataset allows us to empirically identify the causal effect of interrupted relationships. My main findings are that firms that experience an exogenous interruption in their loan officer relationship are faced with three consequences. First, the firms are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms with continuous relationships. Second, when loans are renegotiated, firms with interrupted loan officer relationships receive tougher loan terms. Third, these firms raise more equity, reduce their overall borrowing, and partially substitute borrowing from other banks. These results point to the importance of lending relationships in mitigating the cost of distress for borrowers renegotiating loans. It therefore suggests that bank managers, supervisors, and resolution authorities need to be mindful of the potential costs of changing loan officers.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)