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Toni Ahnert
Research
- Division
Financial Research
- Current Position
-
Senior Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,International Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2022-
Secretary, ECB Working Paper Series
- 2018-
Research Affiliate, Centre for Economic Policy Research (Banking and Corporate Finance)
- Education
- 2008-13
PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, London, UK
- Professional experience
- 2021-22
Lead Economist (ESCB/IO), ECB
- 2018-21
Research Advisor, Bank of Canada
- 2016-18
Principal Researcher, Bank of Canada
- 2013-16
Senior Economist, Bank of Canada
- Awards
- 2011
Lamfalussy Fellowship, ECB
- 24 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2956Details
- Abstract
- We study the importance of information technology (IT) in banking for entrepreneurship. Guided by a parsimonious model, we establish that job creation by young firms is stronger in US counties more exposed to banks with greater IT adoption. We present evidence consistent with banks' IT adoption spurring entrepreneurship through a collateral channel: entrepreneurship increases by more in IT-exposed counties when house prices rise. Further analysis suggests that IT improves banks' ability to determine collateral values, in particular when collateral appraisal is more complex. IT also reduces the time and cost of disbursing collateralized loans.
- JEL Code
- D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
L26 : Industrial Organization→Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior→Entrepreneurship
- 15 February 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2783Details
- Abstract
- We develop a model of financial intermediation with remunerated Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) as consumers’ alternative to bank deposits and an endogenous risk of bank runs. Echoing widespread concerns, higher CBDC remuneration raises bank fragility by increasing consumers’ withdrawal incentives. On the other hand, it also induces banks to offer more attractive deposit contracts in order to retain funding, thereby reducing fragility. This results in a U-shaped relationship between bank fragility and CBDC remuneration. We evaluate policy proposals aimed at mitigating the financial-stability risks of CBDC, such as holding limits and contingent CBDC remuneration.
- JEL Code
- D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 7 December 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2755Details
- Abstract
- How do real interest rates affect financial fragility? We study this issue in a model in which bank borrowing is subject to rollover risk. A bank’s optimal borrowing trades off the benefit from investing additional funds into profitable assets with the cost of greater risk of a run by bank creditors. Changes in the interest rate affect the price and amount of borrowing, both of which influence bank fragility in opposite directions. Thus, the marginal impact of changes to the interest rate on bank fragility depends on the level of the interest rate. Finally, we derive testable implications that may guide future empirical work.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 31 October 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 100Details
- Abstract
- Central banks around the world are exploring the case for central bank digital currency (CBDC) – essentially a digital version of cash. In this article, we provide an overview of the economics of CBDC (Ahnert et al., 2022a). First, we outline the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and motivate the current debate. We then look at the implications for monetary policy and financial stability before discussing policy issues and challenges. Finally, we highlight several areas where our understanding of digital money could be improved by further research.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2713Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides a structured overview of the burgeoning literature on the economics of CBDC. We document the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and review motives for the issuance of CBDC. We then study the implications for the financial system and discuss of a number of policy issues and challenges. While the academic literature broadly echoes policy makers’ concerns about bank disintermediation and financial stability risks, it also provides conditions under which such adverse effects may not materialize. We also point to several knowledge gaps that merit further work, including data privacy and the study of end‐user preferences for attributes of digital payment methods.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Discussion papers
- 16 August 2022
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 20Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides a structured overview of the burgeoning literature on the economics of CBDC. We document the economic forces that shape the rise of digital money and review motives for the issuance of CBDC. We then study the implications for the financial system and discuss of a number of policy issues and challenges. While the academic literature broadly echoes policy makers’ concerns about bank disintermediation and financial stability risks, it also provides conditions under which such adverse effects may not materialize. We also point to several knowledge gaps that merit further work, including data privacy and the study of end‐user preferences for attributes of digital payment methods.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 15 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2710Details
- Abstract
- We study third-party loan guarantees in a model in which lenders can screen, learn loan quality over time and can sell loans before maturity when in need of liquidity. Loan guarantees improve market liquidity and reduce lending standards, with a positive overall welfare effect. Guarantees improve the average quality of non-guaranteed loans traded and thus the market liquidity of these loans due to both selection and commitment. Because of this positive pecuniary externality, guarantees are insufficient and should be subsidized. Our results contribute to a debate about reforming government-sponsored mortgage guarantees by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 May 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2662Details
- Abstract
- We propose a model of financial intermediation, payments choice, and privacy in the digital economy. While digital payments enable mer-chants to sell goods online, they reveal information to their lender. Cash guarantees anonymity, but limits distribution to less efficient of-fline venues. In equilibrium, merchants trade off the efficiency gains from online distribution (with digital payments) and the informational rents from staying anonymous (with cash). Privacy-preserving digi-tal payments raise welfare by reducing privacy concerns, but only ar-rangements that enable data-sharing through consent functionalities guarantee that the social optimum is attained.
- JEL Code
- D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 3 May 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2658Details
- Abstract
- We offer a theory of financial contagion based on the information choice of investors after observing a financial crisis elsewhere. We study global coordination games of regime change in two regions linked by an initially unobserved macro shock. A crisis in region 1 is a wake-up call to investors in region 2. It induces them to reassess the regional fundamental and acquire information about the macro shock. Contagion can occur even after investors learn that region 2 has no ex-post exposure to region 1. We explore normative and testable implications of the model. In particular, our results rationalize evidence about contagious currency crises and bank runs after wake-up calls and provide some guidance for future empirical work.
- JEL Code
- D83 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 3 April 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1667Details
- Abstract
- I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex-ante and are subject to fire sales ex-post. I demonstrate that precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and an efficient equilibrium. I provide a uniqueness refinement to characterize the privately optimal liquidity choice. Because of fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free-ride on the liquidity of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. A macro-prudential authority internalizes the systemic nature of liquidity and restores constrained efficiency by imposing a macro-prudential liquidity buffer.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme
- 2023
- International Journal of Central BankingThe Economics of CBDC
- 2022
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingReal Interest Rates, Bank Borrowing, and Fragility
- 2022
- Review of FinanceA Wake-up Call Theory of Contagion
- 2021
- Journal of Banking and FinanceCheap but flighty: A theory of safety-seeking capital flows
- 2021
- Journal of Financial EconomicsMacroprudential FX Regulations: Shifting the Snowbanks of FX Vulnerability?
- 2021
- Journal of Financial IntermediationShould bank capital regulation be risk-sensitive?
- 2020
- Journal of Financial StabilityBank Runs, Portfolio Choice and Liquidity Provision
- 2019
- Review of Financial StudiesAsset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and Fragility
- 2018
- Journal of Financial StabilityInformation Contagion and Systemic Risk
- 2017
- Review of Financial StudiesInformation Choice and Amplification of Financial Crises
- 2016
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingRollover Risk, Liquidity and Macroprudential Regulation