Níl an t-ábhar seo ar fáil i nGaeilge.
Cornelia Holthausen
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Current Position
-
Director General
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2022
Research in the main fields of interest
- 2018
Advice on policy and research matters in the areas of money markets and the operational framework as well as payments and settlement systems
- 2015
Member of the Editorial Board of the ECB Working Paper Series
- Education
- 1999
PhD in Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
- 1995
MSc in Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
- 1994
Diploma in Economics, Bonn University
- Professional experience
- 2001-
since 2011: Head of Division (ECB, Financial Research Division)
- 2007-2011
2007-2011: Adviser (ECB, Financial Research Division)
- 2005-2007
2005-2007: Principal Economist (ECB, Market Operations Analysis Division)
- 2004-2005
2004-2005: Principal Economist (ECB, Financial Research Division)
- 1999-2004
1999-2004: Economist (European Central Bank, Financial Research Division)
- Awards
- 2010
Bocconi University conference on "Business Models in Banking" best paper prize" (for "Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads"), 2010)
- 2010
Marjolin prize of SUERF (for paper "Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads"), 2010)
- 28 November 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 18 November 2022
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
Q52 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Pollution Control Adoption Costs, Distributional Effects, Employment Effects
Q56 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Environment and Development, Environment and Trade, Sustainability, Environmental Accounts and Accounting, Environmental Equity, Population Growth
Q51 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Valuation of Environmental Effects
Related- 15 November 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 9 November 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 7 November 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 2 November 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 271Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyses the implications of climate change for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. It first investigates macroeconomic and financial risks stemming from climate change and from policies aimed at climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as the regulatory and fiscal effects of reducing carbon emissions. In this context, it assesses the need to adapt macroeconomic models and the Eurosystem/ECB staff economic projections underlying the monetary policy decisions. It further considers the implications of climate change for the conduct of monetary policy, in particular the implications for the transmission of monetary policy, the natural rate of interest and the correct identification of shocks. Model simulations using the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) illustrate how the interactions of climate change, financial and fiscal fragilities could significantly restrict the ability of monetary policy to respond to standard business cycle fluctuations. The paper concludes with an analysis of a set of potential monetary policy measures to address climate risks, insofar as they are in line with the ECB’s mandate.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
- 23 December 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1282Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs vis-à-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs. An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 11 December 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1126Details
- Abstract
- We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the presence of counterparty risk. We allow banks to have private information about the risk of their assets. We show how banks
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
- 26 July 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 507Details
- Abstract
- We study optimal pricing rules for a public large-value payment system (LVPS) that produces a public good (like prevention of systemic risk) but faces competition by a private LVPS for the private provision of large value payments. We show that the marginal cost of the public LVPS has to be corrected by a "public good factor"that can be interpreted alternatively as the decrease in the cost of providing the public good when the private activity of the public system increases, or as the subsidy needed for private banks to internalize the cost of systemic risk. In either interpretation, the public good factor is easy to measure: it corresponds to the subsidy needed for private banks to allocate their payments in the way that is desired by banking authorities.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
H41 : Public Economics→Publicly Provided Goods→Public Goods
- 23 July 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 376Details
- Abstract
- The competition between a central securities depository (CSD) and a custodian bank is analysed in a Stackelberg model. The CSD sets its prices first, the custodian bank follows. There are many investor banks each of which has to decide whether to use the service of the CSD or of the custodian bank. This decision depends on the prices and the investor bank's preferences for the inhomogeneous services of the two service providers. Since the custodian bank uses services provided by the CSD as input, the CSD can raise its rival's costs. However, due to network externalities, the CSD's equilibrium market share is not necessarily higher than socially optimal. This result has important policy implications that are related to a discussion currently taking place in the securities settlement industry.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks - Network
- ECB-CFS Research Network on "Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe"
- 4 March 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 316Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is modeled as a 'cheap talk' game. We show that: (1) unless the interests of the countries are perfectly aligned, Þrst best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically across countries to escape closure.
- JEL Code
- F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
L51 : Industrial Organization→Regulation and Industrial Policy→Economics of Regulation
- 1 July 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 245Details
- Abstract
- The role of money in society has been a controversial topic in economic theory over many years. Particular attention has been devoted to the analysis whether there should be competition in the supply of money, or whether this is best left to a governmental agency. This paper reviews the theoretical literature on these issues. It also gives an overview over some episodes of free banking where banks could issue currency themselves. Finally, we highlight several aspects in which today we have competition between issuers of money, namely in the international context, with electronic money, and in large value payments systems.
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
N10 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations→General, International, or Comparative
- 1 October 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 184Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme for a public monopoly system involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing marginal fee. This is also true when the public system competes with a provate system characterized by a lower marginal cost. However in this case, optimal marginal fees in the public system are lower than its marginal cost, and fixed fees have to be levied. We also study the case of competition between several public systems. The structure of the optimal tariff depends on the willigness of Central Banks to allow by-pass.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
D42 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Monopoly
D43 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- 1 August 2001
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 74Details
- Abstract
- While domestic interbank markets are often considered to work in an efficient way, cross-country bank lending appears to be subjected to market imperfections leading to persistent interest rate differentials. In a model where banks need to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing or by liquidating assets, we study the scope for international interbank market integration with unsecured lending when cross-country information is noisy. We find that an equilibrium with integrated markets need not always exist, and that it coexists with one characterized by segmentation. A repo market reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentation equilibrium. However, it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium.
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- 1 June 2000
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 22Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counter-party in the settlement system.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 2018
- Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38(7), 2006Efficient Pricing of Interbank Payment Systems
- 2018
- Journal of Financial Intermediation 16(1), 2006Raising Rival’s Costs in the Securities Settlement Industry
- 2018
- The Review of Financial Studies 18(2), 2005Interbank Market Integration under Asymmetric Information
- 2018
- The Review of Financial Studies 15(5), 2002Regulating Access to International Large-Value Payment Systems