Niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands
Pär Torstensson
Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability
- Division
Financial Regulation and Policy
- Current Position
-
Principal Financial Stability Expert
- Fields of interest
-
Microeconomics,Law and Economics,Financial Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2021-
Member, BCBS Quantitative Impact Study Group
- 2021-
Member, EBA Task Force on Impact Studies
- 2021-
ECB Co-coordinator, BCBS Policy and Standards Group
- 2021-
ECB Co-coordinator, EBA Standing Committee on Regulation and Policy
- 2021-
Member, EBA Sub-group on Credit Risk
- 2021-
Member, BCBS Credit Risk and Large Exposures Group
- Education
- 2018
Yale Program on Financial Stability, Yale University, New Haven, United States
- 1997-2004
PhD in Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
- 1992-1997
BA in Political Science, Örebro University, Örebro, Sweden
- 1994-1996
MA in Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
- Professional experience
- 2020-2021
Principal Secretariat Official - SSM Secretariat Division, DG SSM Governance & Operations, European Central Bank
- 2011-2020
Principal Financial Stability Expert - Financial Regulation and Policy Division, DG Macro Prud Policy & Financial Stability, European Central Bank
- 2010-2011
Senior Economist - Financial Policy and Analysis Division, Department of Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank
- 2007-2009
Economist - Financial Policy and Analysis Division, Department of Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank
- 2009
Financial Stability Expert - Financial Services Policy Division, Directorate Financial Stability and Supervision, European Central Bank
- 2006-2007
Economist - Secretariat for Research and Analysis, Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication, Government Offices of Sweden
- 2004-2005
Post-doc - Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
- Teaching experience
- 2004-2005
Microeconomics C (Bachelor/Master level), Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
- 1999-2003
Mathematics, Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
- 2 May 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 6 December 2023
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23Details
- Abstract
- This box reviews the final 2017 Basel III reforms, explaining the main elements and their objectives. It provides updates on how the reforms will be transferred into EU legislation via amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRR3/CRD6), as well as on the state of play of the implementation of the 2017 Basel III reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. It also serves as a reminder that the reforms will make banks more resilient and will lead to higher GDP in the long run.
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
K20 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law→General
- 6 December 2023
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 23Details
- Abstract
- This article summarises the existing evidence of window dressing and seasonality of data at year-end reporting time for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Window dressing and seasonality of data distort the outcome of a point-in-time reporting framework, resulting in misleading bank disclosures, mismeasurement of bank risk, inappropriate capital requirements and misallocation of capital. Reduced activity at certain points in time can also be detrimental to market functioning and has the potential to amplify shocks that coincide with period-ends. These negative consequences are amplified by the global nature of the activities and the systemic risk of the banks concerned. Possible policy options for addressing this phenomenon include different reporting requirements, such as averaging over higher frequency data, to ensure that the measurement of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and capital allocation is commensurate with its actual risk to the financial system and the real economy throughout the year.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 17 November 2021
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2021Details
- Abstract
- Numerous European and national initiatives have been deployed since 2014 to reduce non-performing loan (NPL) stocks on euro area bank balance sheets. NPL ratios have fallen as a result, but very gradually, mainly thanks to sales to non-bank investors. Despite stronger market activity, prices paid by NPL investors have only improved marginally and continue to stand well below values assigned to NPLs by banks. One type of NPL that has proven particularly difficult to resolve is loans to non-financial firms that have borrowed from multiple banks – multi-creditor loans. Analysis of these loans relative to others finds lower provision coverage by the lending banks, reflecting more optimistic valuations by individual banks and limited recognition of the expected costs of multi-creditor coordination. This special feature proposes a strategy to overcome creditor coordination failures and costs, through the use of data platforms providing ex ante transparency to NPL investors. These, together with NPL securitisation, could substantially reduce the gap between the value of the loans booked on banks’ balance sheets and the prices offered by investors for NPL portfolios.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 10 November 2020
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 250Details
- Abstract
- This paper contributes to the debate on liquidity in resolution by providing a quantitative assessment of liquidity gaps of banks in resolution in the euro area. It estimates possible ranges of liquidity gaps for significant banks under different assumptions and scenarios. The findings suggest that, while the average liquidity gaps in resolution are limited, the averages hide significant outliers. The paper thus shows that, under adverse circumstances, the instruments currently available to provide liquidity support to financial institutions in the euro area would be insufficient
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
- 2023
- ECB/EIOPA Discussion PaperPolicy options to reduce the climate insurance protection gap
- 2011
- Riksbank’s commission of inquiry into risks on the Swedish housing market reportTools and institutions for influencing house prices and household debt
- 2009
- International Game Theory ReviewAn n-Person Rubinstein Bargaining Game
- 2008
- Social Choice and WelfareStrategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods
- 2008
- Financial Stability Report, No. 2008:2, Sveriges RiksbankFrom local to global – today’s crisis in the light of yesterday’s
- 2007
- Sveriges företagande och konkurrenskraft. Internationell benchmarkingEnergi
- 2007
- Sveriges företagande och konkurrenskraft. Internationell benchmarkingMakroekonomisk översikt
- 2006
- Ekonomisk DebattFotboll och tärningskast. En spelteoretisk analys av straffläggning i fotboll
- 2005
- Working Paper Series, No. 2005:37, Department of Economics, Lund UniversityEvolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion
- 2005
- Working Paper Series, No. 2005:38, Department of Economics, Lund UniversityEvolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point
- 2004
- Ph.D. Thesis 123, Lund Economic Studies, Department of Economics, Lund UniversityEssays on Bargaining and Social Choice
- 2001
- Licentiate Thesis 67, Department of Economics, Lund UniversityAccession Negotiations and Third Part Expectations