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Falk Mazelis

Monetary Policy

Division

Monetary Policy Strategy

Current Position

Senior Economist

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Email

Falk.Mazelis@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2017

PhD in Economics, Humboldt University Berlin

2011

MSc in Industrial Engineering (Dipl.-Ing.), Technical University Berlin

Professional experience
2017-

Senior Economist - Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Monetary Policy, European Central Bank

2015-2017

Research Associate - Collaborative Research Center 649 "Economic Risk" and Institute for Economic Theory II, Humboldt University Berlin

2016

Visiting Student Research Collaborator - Princeton University (Bendheim Center for Finance)

2014-2015

PhD Trainee - European Systemic Risk Board, European Central Bank

2011-2014

Fellow - German Research Foundation, Berlin

2010

Summer Analyst - Investment Banking Division, Barclays Investment Bank, London

2009

Intern - Corporate Finance and Transaction Services, Deloitte, Munich

7 February 2024
ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOX
Economic Bulletin Issue 1, 2024
Details
Abstract
The natural rate of interest is defined as the real rate of interest that is neither expansionary nor contractionary. r* is unobservable and its estimation is fraught with a host of measurement and model-specification challenges. A wide range of estimates obtained from a suite of models and approaches suggests that cyclical measures of euro area r* have been edging higher recently. Yet slow-moving estimates anchored to long-run economic trends are unlikely to have risen measurably.
JEL Code
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
21 March 2023
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2797
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Abstract
We study alternative monetary policy strategies in the presence of the lower bound on nominal interest rates and a low equilibrium real rate using an estimated DSGE model for the euro area. We find that simple feedback rules that implement inflation targeting result in a binding lower bound one-fourth of the time as well as inflation and output exhibiting large downward biases and heightened volatility. Rule-based asset purchases that are activated once the policy rate reaches the lower bound are not able to fully offset the destabilizing effects of the lower bound if we assume plausible limits on the size of purchases. Makeup strategies, especially average inflation targeting with a long averaging window, perform better than inflation targeting. However, differences in performance across strategies become small if the response coefficients of the feedback rules are optimized. In addition, we find that the benefits of makeup strategies tend to vanish if agents exhibit a degree of inattention to central bank policies as estimated in the data.
JEL Code
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E71 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 275
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Abstract
This report discusses the role of the European Union’s full employment objective in the conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy. It first reviews a range of indicators of full employment, highlights the heterogeneity of labour market outcomes within different groups in the population and across countries, and documents the flatness of the Phillips curve in the euro area. In this context, it is stressed that labour market structures and trend labour market outcomes are primarily determined by national economic policies. The report then recalls that, in many circumstances, inflation and employment move together and pursuing price stability is conducive to supporting employment. However, in response to economic shocks that give rise to a temporary trade-off between employment and inflation stabilisation, the ECB’s medium-term orientation in pursuing price stability is shown to provide flexibility to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s full employment objective. Regarding the conduct of monetary policy in a low interest rate environment, model-based simulations suggest that history-dependent policy approaches − which have been proposed to overcome lasting shortfalls of inflation due to the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates by a more persistent policy response to disinflationary shocks − can help to bring employment closer to full employment, even though their effectiveness depends on the strength of the postulated expectations channels. Finally, the importance of employment income and wealth inequality in the transmission of monetary policy strengthens the case for more persistent or forceful easing policies (in pursuit of price stability) when interest rates are constrained by their lower bound.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E24 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Employment, Unemployment, Wages, Intergenerational Income Distribution, Aggregate Human Capital
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 273
Details
Abstract
The last review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003 followed a period of predominantly upside risks to price stability. Experience following the 2008 financial crisis has focused renewed attention on the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should best interact, in particular in an environment of structurally low interest rates and persistent downside risks to price stability. This debate has been further intensified by the economic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. In the euro area, the unique architecture of a monetary union consisting of sovereign Member States, with cross-country heterogeneities and weaknesses in its overall construction, poses important challenges. Against this background, this report revisits monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area from a monetary policy perspective and with a focus on the ramifications for price stability and maintaining central bank independence and credibility. The report consists of three parts. The first chapter presents a conceptual framework for thinking about monetary-fiscal policy interactions, thereby setting the stage for a discussion of specifically euro area aspects and challenges in subsequent parts of the report. In particular, it reviews the main ingredients of the pre-global financial crisis consensus on monetary-fiscal policy interactions and addresses significant new insights and refinements which have gained prominence since 2003. In doing so, the chapter distinguishes between general conceptual aspects – i.e. those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and a single fiscal authority and those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and many fiscal authorities (a multi-country monetary union). ...
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 270
Details
Abstract
The financing structure of the euro area economy has evolved since the global financial crisis with non-bank financial intermediation taking a more prominent role. This shift affects the transmission of monetary policy. Compared with banks, non-bank financial intermediaries are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases. The increasing role of debt securities in the financing structure of firms also leads to a stronger transmission of long-rate shocks. At the same time, short-term policy rates remain an effective tool to steer economic outcomes in the euro area, which is still highly reliant on bank loans. Amid a low interest rate environment, the growth of market-based finance has been accompanied by increased credit, liquidity and duration risk in the non-bank sector. Interconnections in the financial system can amplify contagion and impair the smooth transmission of monetary policy in periods of market distress. The growing importance of non-bank financial intermediaries has implications for the functioning of financial market segments relevant for monetary policy transmission, in particular the money markets and the bond markets.
JEL Code
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
21 September 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 269
Details
Abstract
The ECB’s price stability mandate has been defined by the Treaty. But the Treaty has not spelled out what price stability precisely means. To make the mandate operational, the Governing Council has provided a quantitative definition in 1998 and a clarification in 2003. The landscape has changed notably compared to the time the strategy review was originally designed. At the time, the main concern of the Governing Council was to anchor inflation at low levels in face of the inflationary history of the previous decades. Over the last decade economic conditions have changed dramatically: the persistent low-inflation environment has created the concrete risk of de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Addressing low inflation is different from addressing high inflation. The ability of the ECB (and central banks globally) to provide the necessary accommodation to maintain price stability has been tested by the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of the secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. Against this backdrop, this report analyses: the ECB’s performance as measured against its formulation of price stability; whether it is possible to identify a preferred level of steady-state inflation on the basis of optimality considerations; advantages and disadvantages of formulating the objective in terms of a focal point or a range, or having both; whether the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s policy can serve as a mechanism to cater for other considerations; how to strengthen, in the presence of the lower bound, the ECB’s leverage on private-sector expectations for inflation and the ECB’s future policy actions so that expectations can act as ‘automatic stabilisers’ and work alongside the central bank.
JEL Code
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
10 September 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2587
Details
Abstract
We analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markov-switching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB’s response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above 2% than below 2%. Since then, the ECB’s policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed’s policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute an optimal simple rule for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
19 May 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2555
Details
Abstract
This paper presents a toolkit for generating optimal policy projections. It makes five contributions. First, the toolkit requires a minimal set of inputs: only a baseline projection for target and instrument variables and impulse responses of those variables to policy shocks. Second, it solves optimal policy projections under commitment, limited-time commitment, and discretion. Third, it handles multiple policy instruments. Fourth, it handles multiple constraints on policy instruments such as a lower bound on the policy rate and an upper bound on asset purchases. Fifth, it allows alternative approaches to address the forward guidance puzzle. The toolkit that accompanies this paper is Dynare compatible, which facilitates its use. Examples replicate existing results in the optimal monetary policy literature and illustrate the usefulness of the toolkit for highlighting policy trade-offs. We use the toolkit to analyse US monetary policy at the height of the Great Financial Crisis. Given the Fed’s early-2009 baseline macroeconomic projections, we find the Fed’s planned use of the policy rate was close to optimal whereas a more aggressive QE program would have been beneficial.
JEL Code
C61 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Optimization Techniques, Programming Models, Dynamic Analysis
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
27 November 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2495
Details
Abstract
We estimate the effects of interest rate forward guidance (FG) using a parsimonious VAR, augmented with survey forecast data. The identification strategy of FG shocks via sign and zero restrictions is successfully tested by the recovery of true IRFs from simulated data. The identified shocks from the VAR suggest that FG has a stronger effect on macro variables and deviations are more instantaneous compared to the hump-shaped response following unanticipated changes in monetary policy. We apply this evidence to calibrate free parameters of an otherwise estimated DSGE model in order to dampen the FG Puzzle.
JEL Code
C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
24 June 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2426
Details
Abstract
This paper develops a simple, consistent methodology for generating empirically realistic forward guidance simulations using existing macroeconomic models by modifying expectations about policy announcements. The main advantage of our method lies in the exact preservation of all other shock transmissions. We describe four scenarios regarding how agents incorporate information about future interest rate announcements: “inattention”, “credibility”, “finite planning horizon”, and “learning”. The methodology consists of describing a single loading matrix that augments the equilibrium decision rules and can be applied to any standard DSGE, including large-scale policy-institution models. Finally, we provide conditions under which the forward guidance puzzle is resolved.
JEL Code
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
23 June 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2424
Details
Abstract
Forward guidance operates via the expectations formation process of the agents in the economy. In standard quantitative macroeconomic models, the expectations are unobserved state variables and little scrutiny is devoted to analysing the dynamic behaviour of these expectations. We show that the introduction of survey and financial market-based forecasts in the estimation of the model disciplines the expectations formation process in DSGE models. When the model-implied expectations are matched to observed expectations, the additional information of the forecasts restrains the agents’ expectations formation. We argue that the reduced volatility of the agents’ expectations dampens the model reactions to forward guidance shocks and improves the out-of-sample forecast accuracy of the model. Furthermore, we evaluate the case for introducing a discount factor as a reduced form proxy for a variety of microfounded approaches, proposed to mitigate the forward guidance puzzle. Once data on expectations is considered, the empirical support to introduce a discount factor dissipates.
JEL Code
C13 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Estimation: General
C52 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
13 May 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2406
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Abstract
Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles.
JEL Code
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
20 February 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2376
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Abstract
This paper examines the interactions of macroprudential and monetary policies. We find, using a range of macroeconomic models used at the European Central Bank, that in the long run, a 1% bank capital requirement increase has a small impact on GDP. In the short run, GDP declines by 0.15-0.35%. Under a stronger monetary policy reaction, the impact falls to 0.05-0.25%. The paper also examines how capital requirements and the conduct of macroprudential policy affect the monetary transmission mechanism. Higher bank leverage increases the economy's vulnerability to shocks but also monetary policy's ability to offset them. Macroprudential policy diminishes the frequency and severity of financial crises thus eliminating the need for extremely low interest rates. Countercyclical capital measures reduce the neutral real interest rate in normal times.
JEL Code
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
27 March 2019
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2257
Details
Abstract
We estimate the natural rate of interest for the US and the euro area in a semi-structural model comprising a Taylor rule. Our estimates feature key elements of Laubach and Williams (2003), but are more consistent with using conventional policy rules: we model inflation to be stationary, with the output gap pinning down deviations of inflation from its objective (rather than relative to a random walk). We relax some constraints on the correlation of latent factor shocks to make the original unobserved-components framework more amenable to structural interpretation and to reduce filtering uncertainty. We show that resulting natural rate metrics are more consistent with estimates from structural models.
JEL Code
C11 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Bayesian Analysis: General
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
2023
European Economic Review
  • Gebauer, S. and Mazelis, F.
2023
Economics Letters
  • Holm-Hadulla, F., Mazelis, F. and Rast, S.
2022
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
  • Müller, T., Christoffel, K., Mazelis, F. and Montes-Galdon, C.
2021
Journal of Macroeconomics
  • Maih, J., Mazelis, F., Motto, R. and Ristiniemi, A.