Muokkaa hakua
Pääsivu Media Oheistietoa Tutkimus ja julkaisut Tilastot Rahapolitiikka Euro Maksut ja markkinat Ura EKP:sssä
Hakuehdotuksia
Järjestä tulokset
Ei saatavilla suomeksi

Lars E. O. Svensson

28 February 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2031
Details
Abstract
The main result in Svensson (2017) and its previous versions is that, given current knowledge and empirical estimates, the cost of using monetary policy to "lean against the wind" for nancialstability purposes exceeds the benefit by a substantial margin. Adrian and Liang (2016a) conduct a sensitivity analysis of this result, state that "the result that costs exceed benefits rely critically on assumptions about the change in unemployment in a recession or crisis, the crisis probability, and the elasticity of crisis probability with respect to the interest rate," and provide alternative assumptions that they assert would overturn the result. This paper shows that Adrian and Liang's alternative assumptions are hardly realistic: they exceed existing empirical estimates by more than 11, 13, and 40 standard errors. Adrian and Liang furthermore do not comment on the extensive sensitivity analysis already done in previous versions of Svensson (2017), which supports the robustness of my result.
JEL Code
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
27 April 2005
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 476
Details
Abstract
"Forecast targeting," forward-looking monetary policy that uses central-bank judgment to construct optimal policy projections of the target variables and the instrument rate, may perform substantially better than monetary policy that disregards judgment and follows a given instrument rule. This is demonstrated in a few examples for two empirical models of the U.S. economy, one forward looking and one backward looking. A practical finite-horizon approximation is used. Optimal policy projections corresponding to the optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective can easily be constructed. The whole projection path of the instrument rate is more important than the current instrument setting. The resulting reduced-form reaction function for the current instrument rate is a very complex function of all inputs in the monetary-policy decision process, including the central bank's judgment. It cannot be summarized as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. Fortunately, it need not be made explicit.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
Network
ECB conference on monetary policy and imperfect knowledge
1 February 2000
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 12
Details
Abstract
The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. An example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward-looking indicator is examined. The optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty-equivalence, whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation.
JEL Code
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

Verkkosivustollamme käytetään evästeitä

Toimintoevästeitä käytetään käyttäjän valintojen tallentamiseen ja analytiikkaevästeitä sivuston suorituskyvyn parantamiseen. Kolmannen osapuolen evästeet ovat sivustoille asennettuja ulkopuolisten palveluntarjoajien evästeitä.

Evästeet voi joko hyväksyä tai hylätä. Lisätietoa evästeistä, omista evästevalinnoistasi ja palvelimen lokitiedostoista:

Tietosuojaseloste

Lisätietoja evästeiden käytöstä