Inte tillgängligt på svenska
Jukka Vesala
- 27 July 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 662Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given country that experience a large shock on the same day ("coexceedances") as a function of variables measuring common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in the distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the specification.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 28 April 2005
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 26Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents the methodological and statistical framework for macro-prudential analysis of the financial condition of the EU banking sector that has been adopted by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The framework is also a central component of broader financial stability assessments carried out by the ECB in co-operation with national authorities. The framework has three main building blocks, which draw on a large number of macro-prudential indicators. The first block is designed for assessing the financial condition of the banking sector. The second building block provides a framework for analysing potential sources of risk and vulnerability to which banks are exposed and an assessment of the importance of related exposures. The final part of the analysis deals with the resilience of banks vis-
- JEL Code
- C82 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology, Computer Programs→Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data, Data Access
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 11 February 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 302Details
- Abstract
- The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 28 December 2002
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 6Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides an assessment of the degree of integration in banking services in the euro area. It diverges from the typical analysis on integration in the financial sector by focusing on the main financial products and services provided by banks to corporate and personal clients rather than on financial markets. As the “law-of-one-price” concept is often not applicable to banking products and services, a wide range of quantitative and qualitative indicators of integration is used in the analysis. Indicators of integration are reviewed for three product areas: wholesale (unsecured interbank loans and deposits, repo market) capital market-related (corporate finance services, asset management and trading) and retail (directed to households and small firms). The main conclusions are that while the market on wholesale banking services is strongly integrated and integration is advancing at a fast pace in capital market-related activities, market segmentation is still significant at the retail level.
- 1 June 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 150Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the ability of the distance-to-default and bond spreads to signal bank fragility. We show that both indicators are complete and unbiased and that spreads are non-linear in the probability of bank default. We empirically test these properties in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance-to-default exhibits lead times of 6 to 18 months. Spreads have signal value close to default only, in line with the theory. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators, reducing type I errors. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other bank information.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 1 March 2001
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 47Details
- Abstract
- The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, charter values and risk taking. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between deposit insurance and monitoring, charter values and 'too-big-to-fail.' We find that smaller banks and banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, which supports 'too-big-to-fail', monitoring by debt holders and the moral hazard reducing effect of charter values.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation