Nije dostupno na hrvatskom jeziku.
Natacha Valla
- 14 December 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2215Details
- Abstract
- This paper uses a unique comprehensive database on French security assets and liabilities to study the dynamics of domestic and external sectoral portfolios, their network structure, and their role in the propagation of shocks. We first show how the sharp deterioration of the net external portfolio position of France between 2008 and 2014 was driven by sectoral patterns such as the banking sector retrenchment and the increase in foreign liabilities of the public and corporate sectors, but was mitigated by the expansion of domestic and foreign asset portfolios of insurance companies. We also provide a network representation of the links between domestic sectors and the rest of the world, and document their evolution between 2008 and 2014. Second, we put forward and estimate a model of balance-sheet contagion through inter-sectoral security linkages. The estimation of the model shows that the financial sectors of the economy (banking, mutual fund, and insurance sector) are affected by balance-sheet contagion.
- JEL Code
- F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 17 August 2006
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 668Details
- Abstract
- It is argued that bidders in liquidity-providing central bank operations should typically possess declining marginal valuations. Based on this hypothesis, we construct an equilibrium in central bank refinancing operations organised as variable rate tenders. In the case of the discriminatory pricing rule, bid shading does not disappear in large populations. The predictions of the model are shown to be consistent with the data for the euro area.
- JEL Code
- D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 30 November 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 554Details
- Abstract
- The fixed rate tender is one of the main procedural formats relied upon by central banks in their implementation of monetary policy. This fact stands in a somewhat puzzling contrast to the prevalent view in the theoretical literature that the procedure, by fixing interest rate and quantity at the same time, does not allow a strategic equilibrium. We show that an equilibrium exists under general conditions even if bidders expect true demand to exceed supply on average. The outcome is typically inefficient. It is argued that the fixed rate tender, in comparison to other tender formats, may be an appropriate instrument for central bank liquidity management when market conditions are sufficiently calm.
- JEL Code
- D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 9 September 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 518Details
- Abstract
- This paper analyses the pricing of bank loans and deposits in euro area countries. We show that retail bank interest rates adjust not only to changes in short term interest rates but also to long-term interest rates. This result, which is arguably intuitive for long-term retail bank rates, is also confirmed for bank interest rates on short-term instruments. The transmission of changes in short-term market interest rates along the yield curve is found to be a key factor explaining the sluggishness of retail bank interest rates. We also show that in the cases where we cannot reject that the adjustment of retail rates has changed since the introduction of the euro, this adjustment has become faster.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 29 October 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 399Details
- Abstract
- In certain market environments, a large investor may benefit from building up a futures position first and trading subsequently in the spot market (Kumar and Seppi, 1992). The present paper identifies a variation of this type of manipulation that might occur in money markets with an interest rate corridor. We show that manipulation involving the use of central bank facilities would be observable only sporadically. The probability of manipulation decreases when the central bank uses an active liquidity management. Manipulation can also be reduced by widening the interest rate corridor.
- JEL Code
- D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 27 July 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 378Details
- Abstract
- We model the interbank market for overnight credit with heterogeneous banks and asymmetric information. An unsophisticated bank just trades to compensate its liquidity imbalance, while a sophisticated bank will exploit its private information about the liquidity situation in the market. It is shown that with positive probability, the liquidity effect (Hamilton, 1997) is reversed, i.e., a liquidity drainage from the banking system may generate an overall decrease in the market rate. The phenomenon does not disappear when the number of banks increases. We also show that private information mitigates the effect of an unexpected liquidity shock on the market rate, suggesting a conservative information policy from a central bank perspective.
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 23 December 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 295Details
- Abstract
- On several occasions during the period 2001-2003, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to deviate from its "neutral" benchmark allotment rule, with the effect of not alleviating a temporary liquidity shortage in the banking system. This is remarkable because it implied the possibility of short-term interest rates raising significantly above the main policy rate. In the present paper, we show that when the monetary authority cares for both liquidity and interest rate conditions, the optimal allotment policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to initial conditions. More precisely, we prove that there is a threshold level for the accumulated aggregate liquidity position in the banking system prior to the last operation in a given maintenance period, so that the benchmark allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are above the threshold, and a tight allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are below the threshold.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 1 May 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 233Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we discuss the consequences of taking inot account the variations of the natural real interest rate (rt*) in simple monetary policy rules. We also provide one possible model-based analysis of the level of rt* that has prevailed in the euro area since the early 1970s, and present the implied 'real rate rate gap' as a possible additional indicator to assess the stance of monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- 1 August 2000
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 28Details
- Abstract
- In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents creates an additional motivation for caution in optimal monetary policy. An active policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in inflation expectations, which is detrimental to welfare.
- JEL Code
- D81 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D83 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies