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Fernando González
Horizontal Line Supervision
- Current Position
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Senior Adviser
- Fields of interest
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Financial Economics,Other Special Topics
- Education
- 1993-1995
PhD in Economics, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
- 12 May 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 292Details
- Abstract
- After addressing the securitisation of non-performing loans (NPLs) within the broader context of the ECB’s efforts to reduce NPL stocks and inflows, we investigate the structural and pricing features of NPL securitisations, issued by large banks in the euro area, by drawing on a unique and comprehensive dataset. In doing so, we provide an overview and typology of NPL securitisations issued in the past five years by large banks in the euro area and propose a concrete framework to compare and assess NPL securitisations across multiple dimensions. Despite methodological constraints resulting from the inherently bespoke nature of securitisations, we are able to identify structural differences between transactions that rely solely on private market participants and transactions that benefit from government guarantee schemes. Indeed, the existing data indicates that transactions involving government guarantee schemes display distinct structural features and higher costs for originating banks when compared with purely private market transactions in our dataset. Our analysis indicates that government guarantee schemes might not solely act as an incentive to new investors who would otherwise not invest in NPLs, but possibly also create conditions, for a new market, distinct in particular from the private NPL securitisations market (in terms of asset quality, capital efficiency, etc.). We believe that further research on the impact of government guarantee schemes on market participants’ behaviour and on the pricing and structuring of NPL transactions, as well as their impact over time would greatly help policymakers and supervisors to strengthen the design of future policy options for dealing with NPL stocks.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G29 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Other
- 10 July 2007
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 65Details
- Abstract
- The aims of this paper are twofold: first, we attempt to express the threshold of a single "A" rating as issued by major international rating agencies in terms of annualised probabilities of default. We use data from Standard & Poor's and Moody's publicly available rating histories to construct confidence intervals for the level of probability of default to be associated with the single "A" rating. The focus on the single "A" rating level is not accidental, as this is the credit quality level at which the Eurosystem considers financial assets to be eligible collateral for its monetary policy operations. The second aim is to review various existing validation models for the probability of default which enable the analyst to check the ability of credit assessment systems to forecast future default events. Within this context the paper proposes a simple mechanism for the comparison of the performance of major rating agencies and that of other credit assessment systems, such as the internal ratings-based systems of commercial banks under the Basel II regime. This is done to provide a simple validation yardstick to help in the monitoring of the performance of the different credit assessment systems participating in the assessment of eligible collateral underlying Eurosystem monetary policy operations. Contrary to the widely used confidence interval approach, our proposal, based on an interpretation of p-values as frequencies, guarantees a convergence to an ex ante fixed probability of default (PD) value. Given the general characteristics of the problem considered, we consider this simple mechanism to also be applicable in other contexts.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C49 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics→Other
- 22 December 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 569Details
- Abstract
- We assess monetary convergence preceding the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) through Kalman filtering estimates of the risk premium of eleven forward exchange rates of European and non-European currencies. Since all participating currencies are in effect identical from inception of a currency union, the convergence process to such an identical status should be reflected in the participating currencies' risk premiums prior to monetary union implementation. Starting from this assumption, we show the paths followed by the participating currencies towards monetary union. We find that the co-movements of risk premiums among the preceding European Monetary System (EMS) currencies differ across time periods but display a tendency to convergence to the German mark's risk premium up to EMU implementation. The paper also shows a clear pattern of asymmetry of the participating currencies in relation to the German mark.
- JEL Code
- F02 : International Economics→General→International Economic Order
F31 : International Economics→International Finance→Foreign Exchange
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
- 22 June 2004
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 16Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the potential impact of the growing influence of the opinions of credit rating agencies (CRAs) on market dynamics. This impact can be seen as a consequence of the information content of the ratings themselves or indirectly as a consequence of the "hardwiring" of ratings into regulatory rules, management mandates, bond covenants, etc. Rating agencies who strive to provide credit assessments that remain broadly stable through the course of the business cycle have been themselves affected as the growing reliance on rating mean that they are increasingly expected to satisfy a widening range of constituencies with different and sometimes conflicting interests. They have responded to this challenge largely by adding more products to their traditional product palette but also through modifications in the rating process. It is however too early to say whether these changes mean a fundamental shift in their approach to credit risk measurement.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G29 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Other
- 1 January 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 209Details
- Abstract
- This paper derives a general framework for collateral risk control determination in repurchase transactions or repos. The objective is to treat consistently heterogeneous collateral so that the collateral taker has a similar risk exposure whatever the collateral pledged. The framework measures the level of risk with the probability of incurring a loss higher than a pre-specified level given two well-known parameters used to manage the intrinsic risk of collateral: marking to market and haircuts. It allows for the analysis in a self-contained closed form of the way in which different relevant factors interact in the risk control of collateral (e.g. marking to market frequency, level of volatility of interest rates, time to capture and liquidity risk, probability of default of counterparty, etc.). The framework, which combines the recent theoretical literature on credit and interest risk, provides an alternative quantifiable and objective approach to the existing more ad-hoc rule-based methods used in hair cut determination.
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
- 2024
- SUERF Policy Brief
- 2024
- Risk Control
- 2023
- European Systemic Risk Board Occasional Paper Series
- 2023
- SUERF Policy Brief
- 2014
- Zeitschrift fuer das gesamte KreditwesenTransparency in the European Loan Markets: from words to facts
- 2009
- Cambridge University PressRisk Management for Central Banks and other Public Investors