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Angela Maddaloni
Research
- Division
Financial Research
- Current Position
-
Head of Section
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2021-
Research Fellow - Leibniz Institute SAFE
- 2016-
Team Leader of the ECB research group on Macro-finance and macroprudential policy
- 2020-2022
Head of Section, Financial Intermediation Research, Directorate General Research
- Education
- 2002
Ph.D. Finance, Columbia University, New York, USA
- 2000
M.Phil. Columbia University, New York, USA
- 1993
Laurea cum Laude in Statistics and Economics, University of Siena, Italy
- Professional experience
- 2018-2021
Coordinator of the ECB Research Task Force on Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability
- 2015-2020
Adviser in the Directorate General Research
- 2007-2015
Senior/Principal Economist in the Directorate General Research
- 2006-2007
Senior Economist in the Directorate Monetary Policy
- 2001-2006
Economist in the Directorate Monetary Policy
- Awards
- 2010
Isaak Kerstenetzky Award 2010, Honourable Mention, for the paper "Trusting the bankers: a new look at the credit channel of monetary policy"
- 1995
Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, full tuition fellowship and assistantship, New York, USA, 1995-2000
- 1994
Fellowship from Monte dei Paschi di Siena, visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York, USA 1994-1995
- Teaching experience
- 2001
Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, New York, USA, 2000-2001
- 16 June 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2826Details
- Abstract
- We document the structure of firm-bank relationships for the eleven largest euro area countries and present new stylized facts using data from the Eurosystem credit registry - AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity, and interest rates. Firms in Southern Europe borrow from more banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank than those in Northern Europe. They also tend to borrow more on short-term, more expensive instruments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms in Southern Europe rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with their smaller average size. Relationship lending does not translate into lower rates, possibly because banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates. Finally, assortative matching, according to which small banks specialize in supplying credit to small firms, is stronger in Northern European countries.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G3 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 22 March 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2799Details
- Abstract
- Flows of funds run by banks or by firms that belong to the same financial group as a bank are less volatile and less sensitive to bad past performance. This enables bank-affiliated funds to better weather distress and to hold lower precautionary cash buffers in comparison with their unaffiliated peers. Banks provide liquidity support to distressed affiliated funds by buying shares of those funds that are experiencing large outflows. This, in turn, diminishes the severity of strategic complementarities in investors’ redemptions. Liquidity support and other benefits of bank affiliation are conditional on the financial health of the parent company. Distress in the banking system spills over to the mutual fund sector via ownership links. Our research high-lights substantial dependencies between the banking system and the asset management industry, and identifies an important channel via which financial stability risks depend on the organisational structure of the financial sector.
- JEL Code
- G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G3 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance
- 20 December 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2760Details
- Abstract
- When the Covid-19 crisis struck, banks using internal-rating based (IRB) models quickly recognized the increase in risk and reduced lending more than banks using a standardized approach. This effect is not driven by borrowers’ quality or by banks in countries with credit booms before the pandemic. The higher risk sensitivity of IRB models does not always result in lower credit provision when risk intensifies. Certain features of the IRB models – the use of a downturn Loss Given Default parameter –can increase banks’ resilience and preserve their intermediation capacity also during downturns. Affected borrowers were not able to fully insulate and decreased corporate investments.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 20 December 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 102Details
- Abstract
- When the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic struck, it was vital for many firms to retain access to funding from banks. In order to calculate their capital requirements, banks measure borrowers’ credit risk using either “their own”, internal ratings-based (IRB) models, or a standardised approach. This analysis examines whether model-based bank regulation constrained lending during the COVID-19 crisis. Results show that banks using their own models extended less credit than banks using a standardised approach. This outcome was not dependent on borrowers’ characteristics, or the credit booms seen in some countries, but is connected to the IRB models that some banks use. Certain features of the models such as the “downturn loss-given default” parameter, which reflects how much money a bank can expect to lose when borrowers default on loans during downturns, are helpful to bolster banks’ resilience and preserve their intermediation capacity during times of economic decline.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 24 February 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2647Details
- Abstract
- Recent research developed under the ECB research task force on Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability highlights the existence of trade-offs and spillovers that monetary policy and macroprudential authorities face when deciding on their policy interventions. Monetary policy measures are key to support the supply of credit to the economy, but they could also have unintended consequences on financial stability risks. Macroprudential policies are instead effective in limiting financial stability risks, but they could also reduce the length of economic expansions by preventing credit from flowing to productive economic activities. In addition, since monetary and macroprudential policies transmit to the broad economy via the financial system, they unavoidably affect each other’s effectiveness. Taking these factors into account is key for the design and implementation of both policies.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 24 February 2022
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 18Details
- Abstract
- Recent research developed under the ECB research task force on Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability highlights the existence of trade-offs and spillovers that monetary policy and macroprudential authorities face when deciding on their policy interventions. Monetary policy measures are key to support the supply of credit to the economy, but they could also have unintended consequences on financial stability risks. Macroprudential policies are instead effective in limiting financial stability risks, but they could also reduce the length of economic expansions by preventing credit from flowing to productive economic activities. In addition, since monetary and macroprudential policies transmit to the broad economy via the financial system, they unavoidably affect each other’s effectiveness. Taking these factors into account is key for the design and implementation of both policies.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 24 February 2022
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 92Details
- Abstract
- There are always trade-offs to weigh up when taking monetary and macroprudential policy actions. Thechoice is between supporting the economy by ensuring a smooth supply of credit at favourableconditions, on the one hand, and containing financial stability risks, on the other hand. There are alsosignificant spillovers between the two policies since they are both implemented and transmitted throughthe financial system. Monetary and macroprudential authorities need to take these interactions intoaccount when deciding on interventions. Indeed, there are clear advantages of accounting for financialstability considerations when taking monetary policy decisions and limiting the constraints on the practicalimplementation of macroprudential policy.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 270Details
- Abstract
- The financing structure of the euro area economy has evolved since the global financial crisis with non-bank financial intermediation taking a more prominent role. This shift affects the transmission of monetary policy. Compared with banks, non-bank financial intermediaries are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases. The increasing role of debt securities in the financing structure of firms also leads to a stronger transmission of long-rate shocks. At the same time, short-term policy rates remain an effective tool to steer economic outcomes in the euro area, which is still highly reliant on bank loans. Amid a low interest rate environment, the growth of market-based finance has been accompanied by increased credit, liquidity and duration risk in the non-bank sector. Interconnections in the financial system can amplify contagion and impair the smooth transmission of monetary policy in periods of market distress. The growing importance of non-bank financial intermediaries has implications for the functioning of financial market segments relevant for monetary policy transmission, in particular the money markets and the bond markets.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
- 22 April 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2398Details
- Abstract
- We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach-for-yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private sector (financial and non-financial) securities and dollar-denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 21 April 2020
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 70Details
- Abstract
- How do systemic banks in the euro area react to negative central bank interest rates? This article suggests that they do not generally pass negative rates on to their depositors, and that they search for yield by investing in riskier securities. Their investments are directed more towards securities issued by the private sector and denominated in dollars – in addition to euro.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 27 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2287Details
- Abstract
- The architecture of supervision – how we define the allocation of supervisory powers to different policy institutions – can have implications for policy conduct and for the economic and financial environment in which these policies are implemented. Theoretically, an integrated structure for monetary policy and supervision brings important benefits arising from better information flow and policy coordination. Aggregate supervisory information may significantly improve the conduct of monetary policy and the effectiveness of the lender of last resort function. As long as the process towards an integrated structure does not shrink the set of available tools, monetary policy and supervision are no less effective in pursuing their objectives than a separated structure. Additionally, an integrated structure does not seem to be correlated with more price and/or financial instability, as suggested by analysing a large global set of countries with different supervisory set-ups. A centralised structure for supervision entails significant benefits in terms of fewer opportunities for supervisory arbitrage by banks and less informational asymmetry. A large central supervisor can take advantage of economies of scale and scope in supervision and gain a broader perspective on the stability of the entire banking sector, which should result in improved financial stability. Potential drawbacks of a centralised supervisory structure are the possible lack of specialisation relative to local supervisors and the increased distance between the supervisor and the supervised institutions. We discuss the implications of our findings in the euro area context and in relation to the design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Discussion papers
- 27 May 2019
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 9Details
- Abstract
- The architecture of supervision – how we define the allocation of supervisory powers to different policy institutions – can have implications for policy conduct and for the economic and financial environment in which these policies are implemented. Theoretically, an integrated structure for monetary policy and supervision brings important benefits arising from better information flow and policy coordination. Aggregate supervisory information may significantly improve the conduct of monetary policy and the effectiveness of the lender of last resort function. As long as the process towards an integrated structure does not shrink the set of available tools, monetary policy and supervision are no less effective in pursuing their objectives than a separated structure. Additionally, an integrated structure does not seem to be correlated with more price and/or financial instability, as suggested by analysing a large global set of countries with different supervisory set-ups. A centralised structure for supervision entails significant benefits in terms of fewer opportunities for supervisory arbitrage by banks and less informational asymmetry. A large central supervisor can take advantage of economies of scale and scope in supervision and gain a broader perspective on the stability of the entire banking sector, which should result in improved financial stability. Potential drawbacks of a centralised supervisory structure are the possible lack of specialisation relative to local supervisors and the increased distance between the supervisor and the supervised institutions. We discuss the implications of our findings in the euro area context and in relation to the design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
- 23 May 2019
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 58Details
- Abstract
- What role does prudential regulation play in the prevention of banking crises? Before the financial crisis there were important national differences in the implementation of the EU framework for capital regulation. This article suggests that these differences had important implications for the resilience of banks during the crisis and that, generally, banks that were subject to less stringent prudential regulation before the crisis were more likely to require some form of public support when the crisis came.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 22 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2284Details
- Abstract
- Prior to the financial crisis, prudential regulation in the EU was implemented non-uniformly across countries, as options and discretions allowed national authorities to apply a more favorable regulatory treatment. We exploit the national implementation of the CRD and derive a country measure of regulatory flexibility (for all banks in a country) and of supervisory discretion (on a case-by-case basis). Overall, we find that banks established in countries with a less stringent prudential framework were more likely to require public support during the crisis. We instrument some characteristics of bank balance sheets with these prudential indicators to investigate how they affect bank resilience. The share of non-interest income explained by the prudential environment is always associated with an increase in the likelihood of financial distress during the crisis. Prudential frameworks also explain banks’ liquidity buffers even in absence of a specific liquidity regulation, which points to possible spillovers across regulatory instruments.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 19 May 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2065Details
- Abstract
- We study how the Italian sovereign bond scarcity premia - specialness - in the repo market were affected by the European Central Bank (ECB)'s purchases during the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. We propose and calibrate a search-based dynamic model with a central bank acting as a buy-and-hold investor. Consistent with model predictions, ECB purchases drive specialness of targeted securities in combination with short-selling. Special benchmark bonds entail a positive cash premium but their market liquidity decreases when purchased by the ECB. Short-sellers were more likely to fail-to-deliver very special bonds while holders of these bonds were less inclined to pledge them as collateral to the ECB liquidity operations.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 5 July 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1560Details
- Abstract
- We analyze the impact on lending standards of short-term interest rates and macroprudential policy before the 2008 crisis, and of the provision of central bank liquidity during the crisis. Exploiting the euro area institutional setting for monetary and prudential policy and using the Bank Lending Survey, we show that in the period prior to the crisis, in an environment of low monetary policy interest rates, bank lending conditions unrelated to borrowers' risk were softened. During the same period, we also provide some suggestive evidence of excessive risktaking for mortgages loans. At the same time, we show that the impact of low monetary policy rates on the softening of standards may be reduced by more stringent prudential policies on either bank capital or loan-to-value ratios. After the start of the 2008 crisis, we find that low monetary rates helped to soften lending conditions that were tightened because of bank capital and liquidity constraints, especially for business loans. Importantly, this softening effect is stronger for banks that borrow more long-term liquidity from the Eurosystem. Therefore, the results suggest that monetary policy rates and central bank provision of long-term liquidity complement each other in working against a possible credit crunch for firms.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 25 March 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1527Details
- Abstract
- The Euro area economic activity and banking sector have shown substantial fragility over the last years with remarkable country heterogeneity. Using detailed data on lending conditions and standards, we analyse how financial fragility has affected the transmission mechanism of the single Euro area monetary policy during the crisis until the end of 2011. The analysis shows that the monetary transmission mechanism has been time-varying and influenced by the financial fragility of the sovereigns, banks, firms and households. The impact of monetary policy on aggregate output is stronger during the financial crisis, especially in countries facing increased sovereign financial distress. This amplification mechanism, moreover, operates mainly through the credit channel, both the bank lending and the non-financial borrower balance-sheet channel. Our results suggest that the bank-lending channel has been partly mitigated by the ECB nonstandard monetary policy interventions. At the same time, when looking at the transmission through banks of different sizes, it seems that, until the end of 2011, the impact of credit frictions of borrowers have not been significantly reduced, especially in distressed countries. Since small banks tend to lend primarily to SME, we infer that the policies adopted until the end of 2011 might have fall short of reducing credit availability problems stemming from deteriorated firm net worth and risk conditions, especially for small firms in countries under stress.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 30 April 2012
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 133Details
- Abstract
- Shadow banking, as one of the main sources of financial stability concerns, is the subject of much international debate. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation and liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system. This paper presents a first investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking within the euro area, using the statistical data sources available to the ECB/Eurosystem. Although overall shadow banking activity in the euro area is smaller than in the United States, it is significant, at least in some euro area countries. This is also broadly true for some of the components of shadow banking, particularly securitisation activity, money market funds and the repo markets. This paper also addresses the interconnection between the regulated and the non-bank-regulated segments of the financial sector. Over the recent past, this interconnection has increased, likely resulting in a higher risk of contagion across sectors and countries. Euro area banks now rely more on funding from the financial sector than in the past, in particular from other financial intermediaries (OFIs), which cover shadow banking entities, including securitisation vehicles. This source of funding is mainly shortterm and therefore more susceptible to runs and to the drying-up of liquidity. This finding confirms that macro-prudential authorities and supervisors should carefully monitor the growing interlinkages between the regulated banking sector and the shadow banking system. However, an in-depth assessment of the activities of shadow banking and of the interconnection with the regulated banking system would require further improvements in the availability of data and other sources of information.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 1 October 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1248Details
- Abstract
- Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- 22 July 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1228Details
- Abstract
- Any empirical analysis of the credit channel faces a key identification challenge: changes in credit supply and demand are difficult to disentangle. To address this issue, we use the detailed answers from the US and the confidential and unique Euro area bank lending surveys. Embedding this information within a standard VAR model, we find that: (1) the credit channel is active through the balance-sheets of households, firms and banks; (2) the credit channel amplifies the impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP and inflation; (3) for business loans, the impact through the (supply) bank lending channel is higher than through the demand and balance-sheet channels. For household loans the demand channel is the strongest; (4) during the crisis, credit supply restrictions to firms in the Euro area and tighter standards for mortgage loans in the US contributed significantly to the reduction in GDP.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 26 February 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1160Details
- Abstract
- This study examines empirically the information content of the euro area Bank Lending Survey for aggregate credit and output growth. The responses of the lending survey, especially those related to loans to enterprises, are a significant leading indicator for euro area bank credit and real GDP growth. Notwithstanding the short history of the survey, the findings are robust across various specifications, including
- JEL Code
- C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 30 June 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 913Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides new evidence on the dynamics of equity risk premia in euro area stock markets across country and industry portfolios. We develop and estimate a conditional intertemporal CAPM where returns on aggregate euro area, country and industry portfolios depend on the market risk as well as on the risk that the investment opportunity set changes over time. Prices of risks are time-varying, according to a Kalman filter approach. We find that both market and intertemporal risks are significantly priced. When we include country and industry-specific risk factors they turn out to be not significantly priced for most industries, suggesting that euro area equity markets are well integrated. Overall, the analysis indicates that omitting the intertemporal factor leads to mispricing and misleading conclusions regarding the degree of financial integration across sectors and countries.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
F37 : International Economics→International Finance→International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
- 28 June 2007
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 63Details
- Abstract
- This report analyses the financial position of non-financial enterprises in the euro area, in particular the amount of external financing, the choice between debt and equity and the composition and maturity structure of debt. It aims at identifying the main features of the euro area, as well as the peculiarities that depend on the country of origin and the sector of activity. Attention is also devoted to assessing whether a country's institutional features are correlated with different financial structures by firms. In light of the particular interest in the access of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to financing, the report also analyses how financing patterns differ across large, medium-sized and small enterprises. Finally, the report discusses the recent trends observed in the corporate finance landscape of the euro area over the past few years. Although it is still too early to pass final judgement, vast structural changes are underway that could have already influenced in a positive way in the availability of external funds for firms. All in all, a comprehensive understanding of corporate finance in the euro area is important from a monetary policy perspective, given its impact on the transmission mechanism and for productivity and economic growth. Moreover, such an understanding is also relevant from a financial stability perspective. A first assessment is now possible eight years into the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), given that sufficient data have been accumulated during this period. This assessment is particularly important as the introduction of the single currency has had significant structural effects on the working of financial markets, increasing their size and liquidity, and fostering cross-border competition. The data available for this report generally cover the period 1995-2005, and the cut-off date for the statistics included is 10 March 2007.
- JEL Code
- D92 : Microeconomics→Intertemporal Choice→Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
G30 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→General
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
O16 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Development→Financial Markets, Saving and Capital Investment, Corporate Finance and Governance
K40 : Law and Economics→Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior→General
- 28 August 2006
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 51Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of future demographic trends for economic growth, financial markets and public finances. It shows that in the absence of reforms and responses by economic agents, the currently projected demographic trends imply a decline in average real GDP growth and a severe burden in terms of pay-as-you-go pension and health care systems. Population ageing will change the financial landscape, with a potentially larger role for financial intermediaries and asset prices. All this points to a need to closely monitor demographic change also from a monetary policy perspective. While population projections are surrounded by considerable uncertainty and the effects of demographic change tend to be drawn out, the magnitude of the potential effects calls for an early recognition of this issue. This paper provides some input to the examination of possible policy issues.
- JEL Code
- J11 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
O47 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity→Measurement of Economic Growth, Aggregate Productivity, Cross-Country Output Convergence
- 26 July 2004
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 17Details
- Abstract
- The recent corporate failures in the US and in Europe have considerably damaged investors
- 29 April 2004
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 13Details
- Abstract
- Accounting standard setters are considering the wider use of fair value accounting. This paper focuses on the financial stability implications of a move in the banking sector from the current accounting framework to full fair value accounting. A simulation exercise is performed on how various external shocks affect the balance sheet of an average European bank under the two frameworks. The paper further investigates the impact of the alternative framework on the main balance sheet items, and the interaction with banks
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
M41 : Business Administration and Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting→Accounting and Auditing→Accounting
- 1 May 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 230Details
- Abstract
- Four years after the introduction of the euro, this paper provides an overview of the current structure and integration of the euro area financial systems and related policy initiatives. We first compare the euro area financial structure with that of the United States and Japan. Using new and comprehensive financial account data, we also describe how the euro area financial structure evolved since 1995. We document the progress towards integration of the major euro area financial segments, namely money markets, bond markets, equity markets and banking. Finally, we discuss recent policy initiatives aimed at further improving European financial integration
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- 1 January 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 208Details
- Abstract
- We examine the link between equity risk premiums and demographic changes using a very long sample over the whole twentieth century for the US, Japan, UK, Germany and France, and a shorter sample covering the last third of the twentieth century for fifteen countries. We find that demographic variables significantly predict excess returns internationally. However, the demographic predictability found in the US by past studies for the average age of the population does not extend to other countries. Pooling international data, we find that, on average, faster growth in the fraction of retired persons significantly decreases risk premiums. This demographic predictability of risk premiums is stronger for countries with well-developed social security systems and lesser-developed financial markets.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
J10 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demographic Economics→General
P46 : Economic Systems→Other Economic Systems→Consumer Economics, Health, Education and Training, Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
- 2023
- Review of Corporate FinanceThe Effects of The New European Bank Resolution Framework
- 2020
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingNegative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks' Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register
- 2020
- Journal of Financial Economics
- 2019
- VoxEU
- 2019
- Research Bulletin No.58, May
- 2019
- Annals of Operations Research
- 2017
- Handbook of the Economics of European IntegrationThe credit channel of monetary policy in the euro area
- 2016
- SUERF Conference Proceedings, "The SSM at 1"Prudential regulation, national differences and stability of EU banks
- 2015
- Review of Economics and Dynamics
- 2014
- Comparative Economic Studies
- 2013
- Economic Policy
- 2013
- International Journal of Central Banking
- 2013
- Research Bulletin No 18, Spring
- 2011
- Review of Financial Studies
- 2010
- Bank- en FinanciewezenEuro Area Household Credit Growth: Demand or Supply Driven?
- 2010
- Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference Proceedings on Bank Structure and CompetitionLow Interest Rates, Bank Risk and the Recent Crisis: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards
- 2010
- Research Bulletin No 9, March
- 2010
- Moneda y CréditoBank Credit Standards, Demand, Pro-cyclicality and the Business Cycle
- 2008
- Handbook of European Financial Markets and InstitutionsFinancial Structure and Corporate Governance in Europe, the US and Asia
- 2005
- Financial Market Trends, OECDAgeing and Pension System Reforms: Implications for Financial Markets and Economic Policies
- 2005
- Elements of the euro area: integrating financial marketsHow Are Euro Area Financial Structures Changing
- 2005
- Journal of Business
- 2004
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- 2003
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy