Nėra lietuvių kalba
Aurea Ponte Marques
- 23 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2954Details
- Abstract
- We study the sensitivity of the realised LGD to macroeconomic conditions by exploring Global Credit’s confidential dataset on observed cash flows from defaulted loans. Given the prolonged duration of loan recovery, spanning several years, and the potential for macroeconomic fluctuations during this time frame, our study explores whether the sensitivity of realised LGD to macroeconomic conditions varies based on the timing of cash flows. We find that, regardless of the cash flow timing, the sensitivity of the LGD to macroeconomic conditions is higher for real-estate secured loans than for unsecured loans. The most relevant macroeconomic variables for the secured LGD are unemployment rate and stock returns, followed by house prices and the long-term interest rate. For unsecured loans, real GDP growth and stock returns are the most relevant predictors. These results may be relevant for both micro and macroprudential policymakers by informing on the procyclicality of risk parameters and bank capital requirements.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
- 15 May 2024
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 348Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides an overview of stress-testing methodologies in Europe, with a focus on the advancements made by the European Central Bank’s Financial Stability Committee Working Group on Stress Testing (WGST). Over a four-year period, the WGST played a pivotal role in refining stress-testing practices, promoting collaboration among central banks and supervisory authorities and addressing challenges in the evolving financial landscape. The paper discusses the development and application of various stress-testing models, including top-down models, macro-micro models and system-wide models. It highlights the integration of new datasets and model validation efforts as well as the expanded use of stress-testing methodologies in risk and policy evaluation and in communication. The collaborative efforts of the WGST have demystified stress-testing methodologies and fostered trust among stakeholders. The paper concludes by outlining the future agenda for continued improvements in stress-testing practices.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
- 15 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2711Details
- Abstract
- What is the impact of stress tests on bank stock prices? To answer this question we study the impact of the publication of the EU-wide stress tests in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2021 on the first (λ) and second (δ) moment of equity returns. First, we study the effect of the disclosure of stress tests on (cumulative) excess/abnormal returns through a one-factor market model. Second, we study whether both returns and volatility of bank stock prices changes upon the disclosure of stress tests through a structural GARCH model, developed by Engle and Siriwardane (2018). Our results suggest that the publication of stress tests provides new information to markets. Banks performing poorly in stress tests experience, on average, a reduction in returns and an increase in volatility, while the reverse holds true for banks performing well. Banks performing moderately have rather a small effect on both mean and variance process. Our findings are corroborated by the observed rank correlation between bank abnormal returns or equity volatility and stress test performance, which experiences a steady increase after each publication event. These results suggest that the publication of stress tests improves price discrimination between 'good' and 'bad' banks, which can be interpreted as a certification role of the stress tests in the stock market.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 June 2022
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17Details
- Abstract
- The publication of stress test results improves transparency and market discipline. It promotes financial stability by generating new information, thus improving the ability of markets to discriminate between banks. The results of this analysis confirm the certification role of stress tests.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 28 June 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13Details
- Abstract
- This article studies the impact of the ECB’s dividend recommendations on banks’ lending and loss-absorption capacity during the COVID-19 crisis. It finds that the policy has been effective in mitigating the potential procyclical adjustment of banks. Banks that did not distribute previously planned dividends increased their lending by around 2.4% and their provisions by approximately 5.5%, thus strengthening their capacity to absorb losses. Notably, the recommendations appear to have mitigated the procyclical behaviour of banks closer to the threshold for automatic restrictions on distributions. Overall, the recommendations were successful in conserving capital and helping the banking system support the real economy and facilitate the recognition of future losses.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 30 November 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2497Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of macroprudential capital buffers on banking groups' lending and risk-taking decisions, also investigating implications for internal capital markets. For identification, we exploit heterogeneity in buffers applied to other systemically important institutions, using information from three unique confidential datasets, including information on the EBA scoring process. This policy design induces a randomized experiment in the neighborhood of the threshold, which we use to identify the effect of higher capital requirements by comparing the change in the outcome for banks just above and below the cut-off, before and after the introduction of the buffer. The analysis is implemented relying on a fuzzy regression discontinuity and on a difference-in-differences matching design. We find that, when parent banks are constrained with higher buffers, subsidiaries deleverage lending and risk-taking towards non-financial corporations and marginally expanded lending towards households, with negative effects on profitability. Also, we find that parents cut down on holdings of debt and equity issued by their subsidiaries. Our findings support the hypothesis that higher capital buffers have a positive disciplinary effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having a (temporary) adverse impact on the real economy through a decrease in affiliated banks' lending activity. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, it is essential that policymakers assess their potential cross-border effects.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 26 May 2020
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2020Details
- Abstract
- Many euro area countries have made loan guarantee schemes a central element of their support packages in response to the coronavirus shock (see Chapter 1). In the face of acute revenue and income losses, these temporary schemes can support the flow of credit to the real economy and thereby help stabilise the banking system. This box sets out an illustrative assessment of how the announced schemes are intended to operate, and how they might affect the scale of losses that banks may face in the quarters ahead.
- 28 June 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2292Details
- Abstract
- We study the impact of higher bank capital buffers, namely of the Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII) buffer, on banks' lending and risk-taking behaviour. The O-SII buffer is a macroprudential policy aiming to increase banks' resilience. However, higher capital requirements associated with the policy may likely constrain lending. While this may be a desired effect of the policy, it could, at least in the short-term, pose costs for economic activity. Moreover, by changing the relative attractiveness of different asset classes, a higher capital requirement could also lead to risk-shifting and therefore promote the build-up (or deleverage) of banks' risk-taking. Since the end of 2015, national authorities, under the EBA framework, started to identify banks as O-SII and impose additional capital buffers. The identification of the O-SII is mainly based on a cutoff rule, ie. banks whose score is above a certain threshold are automatically designated as systemically important. This feature allows studying the effects of higher capital requirements by comparing banks whose score was close to the threshold. Relying on confidential granular supervisory data, between 2014 and 2017, we find that banks identified as O-SII reduced, in the short-term, their credit supply to households and financial sectors and shifted their lending to less risky counterparts within the non-financial corporations. In the medium-term, the impact on credit supply is defused and banks shift their lending to less risky counterparts within the financial and household sectors. Our findings suggest that the discontinuous policy change had limited effects on the overall supply of credit although we find evidence of a reduction in the credit supply at the inception of the macroprudential policy. This result supports the hypothesis that the implementation of the O-SII's framework could have a positive disciplining effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having only a reduced adverse impact
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 4 October 2018
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 214Details
- Abstract
- This study provides a conceptual and monitoring framework for systemic liquidity, as well as a legal assessment of the possible use of macroprudential liquidity tools in the European Union. It complements previous work on liquidity and focuses on the development of liquidity risk at the system-wide level. A dashboard with a total of 20 indicators is developed for the financial system, including banks and non-banks, to assess the build-up of systemic liquidity risk over time. In addition to examining liquidity risks, this study sheds light on the legal basis for additional macroprudential liquidity tools under existing regulation (Article 458 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Articles 105 and 103 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and national law), which is a key condition for the implementation of macroprudential liquidity tools.