Ni na voljo v slovenščini.
Eduardo Dávila
- 20 September 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2723Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies optimal second-best corrective regulation, when some agents/activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of environments. We show that a subset of policy elasticities, leakage elasticities, determine optimal second-best policy, and characterize the marginal value of relaxing regulatory constraints. We apply our results to scenarios with unregulated agents/activities, uniform regulation across agents/activities, and costly regulation. We illustrate our results in applications to financial regulation with environmental externalities, shadow banking, behavioral distortions, asset substitution, and fire sales.
- JEL Code
- H23 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue→Externalities, Redistributive Effects, Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q58 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Government Policy
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
D62 : Microeconomics→Welfare Economics→Externalities - Network
- ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme