

Growth of non-bank financial intermediaries, financial stability, and monetary policy

### **Discussion**

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# Summary of the Paper

#### Growth of NBFIs

- Commonality in overall trend between EA and US
- Structural differences: EA more bank-centric
  - EA NBFIs relatively more *inside* banking firms (subsidiaries/affiliates in EA banking groups)

### Financial Stability

- Growth of NBFIs in EA can be an opportunity to develop markets and enhance resiliency/redundancies
- But complexity may beget fragility
  - Structural challenges in EA Market fragmentation; Outward oriented NBFIs; Uneven supervisory framework for NBFIs

### 3. Monetary Policy

- Multiplication of transmission channels
- NBFIs as potential vehicles to bridge gaps in fragmented EA, achieve smoother pass through
- Access to CB liquidity a necessary step?


## A Complementary Perspective

- Take a step back
- Why do Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries emerge?
- Are there common principles explaining NBFIs growth?
- Leverage such principles to develop a coherent, unified (and jurisdiction neutral)
  view to interpret growth of NBFIs, the financial stability implications and related
  monetary policy considerations

## NBFIs Naturally Dependent on Banks

- Nonbanks engaging in *intermediation* activities Maturity/Liquidity transformations
- Management of liquidity risk essential component of intermediation activities
- Intrinsic fragilities
- How do banks manage liquidity risk?
  - Access to stable deposit funding. Deposit insurance important factors behind stability
  - Access to CB liquidity
- NBFIs do not have standard access to liability guarantees, nor to liquidity facilities
- Banks the natural providers of liquidity to NBFIs

## Strong evidence of role of banks supporting growth of NBFIs



- Growing bank exposures to NBFIs in EA as well
- Especially important growth of committed lines (EBA, 2024)

"Where Do Banks End and NBFIs Begin?" (2024), Acharya, Cetorelli and Tuckman

"Transformation of Risks across Banks and NBFIs" (2025) Acharya, Cetorelli and Tuckman

## Revisit NBFI growth

- NBFI asset growth *per se* only telling a partial story
- Growth of NBFIs not necessarily implying a *substitution* of banks
- Rather, a transformation of the role banks play in intermediation ecosystem
- Hypothetical counterfactual: Absent bank support, NBFI growth much reduced

## Revisit Financial Stability implications

- Underestimation of banks' true risk exposures
  - Banks may be less exposed to credit risk, but more exposed to liquidity risk
- Underappreciation of risk propagation and amplification mechanisms between banks and NBFIs
  - Banks themselves a vector of instability
  - Fire sale dynamics
- Pernicious externalities in a system increasingly less subject to prudential standards

## Revisit Monetary Policy considerations

- Should NBFIs be granted access to CB liquidity?
  - Standard trade offs well understood
    - Boost NBFIs role in bridging fragmented EA markets
    - Design access to minimize moral hazard
- Conjecture: It may not be a stable equilibrium
  - Access to CB liquidity would break down NBFI dependence on banks
  - And reduce uniqueness/specialness of banks
  - Should lead (this time for real) to debasement of banks
  - Might then trigger "political economy" forces
    - Banks invoking leveling of playing field
    - A race to the (regulatory) bottom

## An alternative approach

- Leverage the financial conglomerate model prevalent in EA!
- Provide conditions for the growth of NBFIs inside banking groups
- Best of both worlds?
  - Growth of specialist intermediaries that can support capital market development and reduction in market segmentation
  - And intermediaries subject to homogeneous prudential standards
- Liquidity needs internalized within the conglomerate, across bank and nonbank subsidiaries
  - This was the prevalent model in the U.S. up to the GFC ("The Nonbank Footprint of Banks", 2025 Cetorelli and Prazad)
  - Intermediaries inside U.S. BHCs *less reliant* on CB liquidity in times of stress

## Takeaways

- This is <u>NOT</u> a Ptolemaic view, with banks at the center of the intermediation universe
- Quite the contrary, recognizing banks are just one component of an increasingly complex ecosystem
- Banks and NBFIs in a symbiotic relationship
- Not a bug of the system but a structural feature and jurisdiction neutral
- Key to develop insights into evolution of the system and related policy making