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**EXIT STRATEGIES FROM
QUANTITATIVE EASING:
THE ROLE OF THE
FISCAL-MONETARY
POLICY MIX**



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM




Exit strategies from Quantitative Easing: the role of the fiscal-monetary policy mix

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Motivation

- Federal Reserve's balance sheet expansion
- Assets purchases: mainly long-term treasuries



Note: Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Source: US Financial Accounts.

- New challenge:** high inflation in the context of large public debt-to-GDP ratio and expanded central bank balance sheet
- Increases in the policy rate with balance sheet reduction, i.e. Quantitative Tightening (QT)

This paper:

Studies the impact of QT on inflation, sovereign debt, and interest rates, considering the interaction between fiscal-monetary policies

Macroeconomic effects of QT

- Central bank reduces purchases of (or sells) government bonds
- ↓ price of government bonds
- ↓ Central bank profits, ↑ debt service, ↑ public debt

Key: how the central bank and government stabilize public debt

- The government adjust primary fiscal surplus: **Monetary-led regime**
- The central bank allows inflation rate to adjust: **Fiscally-led regime**

Regime-switching NK-DSGE model calibrated to the US economy

Simulate the COVID-19 crisis, policy response, QT under **different regimes**

Model

Regime-Switching NK-DSGE model:

- Agents: Firms, Households (HH), Financial Intermediaries (FI), Fiscal Authority, Monetary Authority
- Short-term public bonds/reserves: B_t^S , price $Q_t^S = \frac{1}{R_t}$, 1 period maturity
- Long-term public bonds: B_t^L , price Q_t^L , maturity $1/\delta$
- Market segmentation and leverage constraint in FI, Elenev et al., 2021

Fiscal rule for taxes

$$\tau_t - \tau^* = \rho_\tau(\tau_{t-1} - \tau^*) + (1 - \rho_\tau)\gamma(b_{t-1} - \bar{b}) + e^{\sigma_\tau \epsilon_t^\tau}$$

Monetary policy

$$\text{Taylor rule } \frac{R_t}{\bar{R}} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{\bar{R}}\right)^{\alpha_R} \left[\left(\frac{\pi_t}{\bar{\pi}}\right)^{\alpha_\pi} \left(\frac{y_t}{\bar{y}}\right)^{\alpha_y}\right]^{1-\alpha_R} e^{\sigma_M \epsilon_t^M}$$

QE: buy long-term public bond from households, issuing reserves to FI


$$\frac{B_t^{L,CB}}{P_t} = b_t^{L,CB} = (1 - \rho^{QE})b_*^{L,CB} + \sigma^{QE}b_{t-1}^{L,CB} + \rho^{QE}\epsilon_t^{QE}$$

Regime-switching parameters in policy rules, Bianchi & Melosi (2017)

Policy regimes:

- Monetary-led regime (M):** high α_π, γ
- Fiscally-led regime (F):** low α_π, γ
- Zero lower bound (ZLB):** $\bar{R} \approx 1, \alpha_\pi = \gamma = 0$

Transmission mechanism of QT




↓ Q_t^L , and the term spread increases

- Wealth and substitution effect: recessive and deflationary
- ↓ Central bank profits, ↑ debt service, ↑ public debt

COVID-19 crisis simulation

- Simulate the COVID-19 crisis in the US:
 - 50.000 samples
 - Negative demand and supply shocks
 - Regime: stochastic every period, at each sample
- QE program: increase the central bank balance sheet-to-GDP by 13p.p., and compare dynamics with and without QE




Note: Simulated crisis. Average from 50.000 samples. Annualized variables.


Unwinding the central bank balance sheet

Study exit strategies in the recovery, from $t=9$:

- Constant balance sheet (BS):** Maintain the size around 20% of GDP
- QT:** Don't repurchase matured bonds (speed δ)
- Aggressive QT:** sales of bonds (speed $> \delta$)




QT at Monetary-led regime



Note: Subsample with monetary-led regime at exit. Plots since $t=8$.

- QT: ↓ Inflation, ↑ public debt
- Monetary-led regime:** ↑ public debt → ↑ taxes

QT at Fiscally-led regime



Note: Subsample with fiscally-led regime at exit. Plots since $t=8$.

- QT: ↓ Inflation, ↑ public debt
- Fiscally-led regime:** ↑ public debt → ↑ inflation

Conclusions

Macroeconomic effects of QT depend on Fiscal-Monetary policy mix

- Monetary-led regime:** Decreases inflation
- Fiscally-led regime:** Debt and spreads increase, little effect on inflation
- Without an appropriate fiscal framework to stabilize debt, there are no clear advantages of doing QT

References

- Bianchi, F. and L. Melosi (2017): "Escaping the great recession," AER, 107, 1030–58.
- Elenev, V., T. Landvoigt, P. J. Shultz, and S. Van Nieuwerburgh (2021): "Can Monetary Policy Create Fiscal Capacity?" NBER WP 29129