# Discussion of Geography versus Income: The Heterogeneous Effects of Carbon Taxation by Charles Labrousse and Yann Perdereau

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## The Paper

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#### A simplified framework (technically: CES Stone-Geary $\rightarrow$ will come back to that)

1. Energy is a necessity good:

geography-specific min. subsistence requirement  $\overline{e}_k$ ,  $k \in \{rural, urban\}$ 

2. Rural households use more energy & a browner energy mix:

 $p_{e,rural} \,\overline{e}_{rural} > p_{e,urban} \,\overline{e}_{urban} \xrightarrow{\text{carbon tax}} p'_{e,rural} \,\overline{e}_{rural} >> p'_{e,urban} \,\overline{e}_{urban}$ 

#### $\Rightarrow$ Heterogeneous effects of carbon taxation: Geography trumps income

$$\begin{split} \Delta(u_{poor,k} - u_{rich,k}) &= \Delta(y_{poor} - y_{rich}) \approx 0 \\ \Delta(u_{i,rural} - u_{i,urban}) &= -\Delta(p_{e,rural} \,\overline{e}_{rural} - p_{e,urban} \,\overline{e}_{urban}) << 0 \end{split}$$



### My take

- Tremendous work in disciplining the model with microdata;
- Impressive job in matching so many dimensions between the model and the data: income distribution (also across regions), energy shares (for households and firms and across regions), MPCs, taxation structure, ...
- Delivering a sharp, path-breaking message:

Heterogeneous effects of carbon taxation: Geography trumps income!

#### Two main / big picture thoughts:

- $\left(1
  ight)$  Direct and indirect effects on welfare
- 2 Optimal policy trade-offs
- ... Plus some minor / technical ones:
  - i) investment; ii) leisure; iii) housing; iv) non-homotheticity; v) aggregation.

# (1) Direct and Indirect Effects on Welfare

1. **Direct Effect** (from carbon tax on households  $\tau_t^h$ )

$$u_{i,k} = y_i - \underbrace{p_{e,k} \overline{e}_k}_{\uparrow\uparrow}$$

2. Indirect Effect (from carbon tax on firms  $\tau_t^f$ )

$$u_{i,k} = \underbrace{y_i}_{\downarrow\downarrow} - p_{e,k} \,\overline{e}_k$$

 $y_i$  derived from more carbon-intensive production in rural areas.

- ▶ In the paper: (1) and (2) explored either jointly, or one at a time.
- Possible to quantify relative contribution to overall \(\Delta CE\) of direct and indirect (and transfers) when jointly present?

# 2 Optimal policy trade-offs

Welfare objective:

$$\mathbb{W} = \alpha \times \text{Welfare change} + \beta \times \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \text{Emissions reduction}_{t}$$

- 1. Possible to model the social cost of emissions to microfound  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ?
- 2. What is *the* optimal policy trade-off (aside from political economics considerations) once we pin down  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ?



# Minor/technical comments (I)

- i. Investment in energy efficiency: what if households can invest in energy efficiency, which might be easier in rural areas (e.g. solar panels on roof)?

   ē<sub>rural</sub> ↓↓, ē<sub>urban</sub> ↓ in the medium- long-run?
- ii. Leisure: currently not modeled, but might be relevant for welfare comparisons? e.g. urban commuting time > rural commuting time  $\Rightarrow$  *leisure<sub>urban</sub>* < *leisure<sub>rural</sub>*
- iii. Housing: might also be relevant for welfare comparisons?
  - a. Housing is a necessity ( Data );
  - b.  $P_{H,urban} > P_{H,rural}$
  - $\Rightarrow$  Urban households not that better-off to start with.

Carbon taxation might end up being progressive?

# Minor/technical comments (II)

More technical:

- iv. **Structure of non-homothetic preferences**: why 2 layers of non-homothetiticity to model higher energy shares for poor/rural?
  - 1. Stone-Geary CES (with geography-specific min. subsistence requirement)
  - 2. Comin et al. (2021)

Not very transparent why you need both:

- Qualitatively, (1) sufficient to get higher energy shares for poor & rural.
- ▶ Need to nest (1) into (2) to get enough curvature to *quantitatively* match the data?
- v. **Aggregation for CE computation**: how do you weigh heterogeneous households to compute the aggregate measure?

# **Backup Slides**

## Energy expenditure shares



#### by degree of urbanization and income quintile

Notes: share of utilities and transport services in total consumption expenditure. Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey; data for 2024 Q1 and Q2.



#### Housing expenditure shares





Notes: share of housing (rent, maintenance/repair costs, home owner/renter insurance, but excluding mortgage payments) in total consumption expenditure. Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey; data for 2024 Q1 and Q2.