

BANCA D'ITALIA

FILIALE SERVIZIO SEGRETERIA PARTICOLARE

1988 X 21 14:33

847

SUPPORTO PER LA TRASMISSIONE/RICEZIONE DI FACSIMILE DI DOCUMENTI

MITTENTE: PADOA-SCHIOPPA TOMMASO
 Numero di telefax 00396-464882
 NOTE URGENT - CONFIDENTIAL

DESTINATARIO: Mr. GUNTER BAER
 Numero di telefax BRI
 All'attenzione di _____

DOCUMENTO: N. pagine 5+1 n. protocollo _____ del 21.10.88
 Oggetto/descrizione MEMO ON ^(eventuale) EMU + LETTER

TRASMISSIONE: Data 21.10.88 richiedente TRAMONTE T. firma [signature]
 Si autorizza: La Direzione [signature]
 Trasnesso il _____ alle ore _____ n. sessione _____
 L'Operatore _____

RICEZIONE: Ricevuto il _____ alle ore _____ n. sessione _____
 L'Operatore _____ V° La Direzione _____

CONSEGNA: Per ricevuta documento originale con «message confirmation report»
 Per ricevuta facsimile

firma _____ data _____ ora _____

TOMMASO PADOA SCHIOPPA

Rome, October 21, 1988

To: Mr. Gunter BAER
Mr. Joly DIXON
Mr. Jean Paul MINGASSON

This is a draft of the "framework note" for the November meeting of the Committee.

Joly and Jean Paul could transmit a copy to the President so that he can read it before our meeting on November 25th.

As I shall be in Brussels in the early morning of November 25, I suggest that the four of us meet at the Banca d'Italia office (Rue Ducale, 47/49, telephone 513.88.90) at 12, with Daniel Gros, to discuss Daniel's paper and other issues. We could have lunch together. Please confirm to my secretary if this arrangement suits you.

Tommasso.

MONETARY UNION AND A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS

1. October meeting. In its second meeting (Luxembourg, October 1988) the Committee has discussed the essential features of an economic union, consistent with a monetary union. Such features fall under three broad categories. Firstly, arrangements ensuring effective freedom of movement to goods, persons, services and capital. Secondly, arrangements to foster economic adjustment without exchange rates changes that are by definition ruled out in a monetary union. Such arrangements range from removal of impediments to the working of market mechanisms (e.g. competition policy), to adjustment-promoting regional policies in combination with financial transfers (e.g. training programmes). Thirdly, constraints on national budgetary policies to prevent fiscal imbalances which could threaten monetary stability in the union. These additional constraints on national budgetary policy, ranging from strengthened fiscal coordination to binding rules of budgetary discipline, were regarded as necessary as it was generally felt that market discipline would work too slowly and too weakly.

There was a general view that the process of realizing economic and monetary union requires from the outset the drafting of a new treaty. The treaty should define the final stage, and indicate clearly how the constituting elements of the union would be assembled. It should also state the procedures for moving from one stage to the next, with each stage being consistent with the final objective.

2. Monetary union. In the October meeting the existence of a monetary union was taken as given. A discussion of its structure and features is planned for November.

In its debates so far the Committee has retained the definition of monetary union presented in the Werner report and in the 1971 resolution:

- (a) a single currency area, implying total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of exchange rate fluctuations and the irrevocable locking of parities;
- (b) complete liberalization of capital transactions and full integration of banking and financial markets.

The implementation of (b) is already agreed complete liberalization of capital transactions is scheduled for July 1990, full integration of banking and other financial services for January 1993. As to the (a) there is a broad agreement that more coordination of monetary policies is not sufficient to create a "single currency area" through the "irrevocable locking of parities". What is required is one monetary policy and an organ which is able to take operational decisions on a continuous time.

The problems that have to be solved in order to establish the monetary union as defined above are essentially related to two sets of issues: one concerns the institution, its organization and tasks, the other concerns the currency and related arrangements. Without disregarding the strong interrelations between these issues, they may be discussed separately. On the basis of the notes submitted by Professor Thygesen and Governor de Larosière the problems concerning the institution could be discussed in November. The following meeting could concentrate on the issues concerning the currency, with the help of notes prepared by President Duisenberg and Governor Ciampi, on the parallel currency concept and the ECU respectively.

3. Issues for the November Meeting. At the meeting in November the Committee may wish to examine the following institutional issues:

(a) Principles. As a starting point the Committee may refer to what President Pöhl has called the "decisive principles that absolutely must be taken into account when setting up a European central bank system" (pp. 12-14 of the paper "Further Development of the European Monetary System"):

- i) mandate to maintain stability of the value of money as the prime objective of European monetary policy;
- ii) independence from national governments and Community authorities;
- iii) voting power based on the economic importance of the member countries;
- iv) a federal structure;
- v) limitations on credit that can be granted to public authorities, including those of the Community;
- vi) policy instruments capable of managing the money supply effectively without recourse to quantitative controls;
- vii) banking supervision integrated with the independent European central bank.

An additional issue of principle, that is touched upon in President Pöhl's paper and that the Committee may wish to discuss, is the accountability of a European central bank.

(b) A system of European central banks ("The Centre"). In designing the organs of a monetary union it is natural to draw inspiration from decentralized central banks and monetary organizations, in nations with a federal structure. The Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System of the United States are useful terms of reference.

Four questions seem particularly relevant in the design of a European system of central banks. Firstly, it will have to be decided which monetary policy decisions will have to be taken by "the Centre" and which ones may be left to local (national) central banks. Secondly, to what extent does "the Centre" need operational instruments and to what extent may it rely on the "executive arm" of one or more of the national central banks (as in the case of the Board of the Fed in Washington and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York)? Thirdly, the problem of the internal structure of a System of European central banks, the governing bodies and decision-making procedures. Finally, the place of the new institution in the system of Community and national institutions, including questions relating to appointment of members of the governing bodies, terms of office, relationships with other Community institutions.

Some of these issues are expected to be addressed in the note prepared by Professor Thygesen.

(c) The first step. In the October meeting it was suggested that the first step on the way to monetary union should be based on the new treaty and that stage one should be an "embryo" of the final situation, in the sense that it should contain the essential ingredients of it. It was also suggested that "something to manage", i.e. a policy responsibility, should be conferred to "the Centre" from the start.

The note prepared by Governor de Larosière will provide the basis for a first discussion of step one.

21.10.88