9.5.2006   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 109/10

1.1

The proposed directive is a very welcome initiative, as it establishes a comprehensive legal framework for payment services in the EU. Currently, the diversity of national legislation relating to payments makes implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) problematic. Harmonisation of the national legal requirements for payments will therefore assist the banking industry in its efforts to establish the SEPA. Moreover, the introduction of the concept of ‘payment institutions’ should lead to the harmonisation of access rules to the market for payment services. However, to fully exploit the advantages of harmonised legislation, attention should be paid to aligning the scope of the proposed directive and that of the E-money Directive (2), in particular taking account of the need to differentiate between payment services based on payment accounts and e-money payment services based on centralised accounting. Should the adoption of the proposed directive be delayed, however, the introduction of SEPA-compliant national schemes on 1 January 2008 and the full migration of these by 2010 could be put at risk. In this regard, Titles III and IV of the proposed directive are crucial as they introduce a harmonised set of rules regarding information requirements, authorisation, execution and liability in respect of payment transactions. It appears that the policy and legal issues in these Titles of the proposed directive might be solvable within a relatively short time frame. If negotiations are prolonged, the option of carving out certain parts of the proposed directive by giving priority to adoption of the parts necessary for successful implementation of the SEPA could be considered.

1.2

However, certain aspects of the proposed directive raise a number of concerns which are set out in more detail below.

2.1

The introduction of a new concept of ‘payment institutions’ is a step towards harmonising the current diversity of approaches under national law to the regulation of entities that provide payment services without being a credit institution, an e-money institution or a post office giro institution. However, the proposed directive is not clear concerning the kinds of activities that such payment institutions may perform. Under the proposed directive, payment institutions may receive funds from the public for the provision of payment services. These funds should not, however, be deposits or other repayable funds within the meaning of Article 3 of the Consolidated Banking Directive (3), or e-money as defined in Article 1(3)(a) of the E-money Directive (see Article 10(1) of the proposed directive).

2.2

In this respect, the wording of the proposed directive does not make it clear whether payment institutions may hold funds having similar economic and legal characteristics to deposits or e-money. The ability of payment institutions to provide payment accounts implies that payment institutions could keep funds for a longer period than is necessary to finalise a payment transaction. This is a matter for concern, as Article 65(4) of the proposed directive refers to ‘savings accounts’ without explaining where these accounts are held and for what purpose. However, recitals 8 and 9 to the proposed directive state that payment institutions may not take deposits. These points are elaborated further below.

2.3

It is also noted that under paragraph 4 of the Annex to the proposed directive, payment institutions may execute payment transactions if the funds are covered by a credit line without there being any restrictions on the ability to grant credit in terms of the amount and/or the maturity of the credit.

3.1

With regard to the holding of deposits or other repayable funds, it should be recalled that Article 3 of the Consolidated Banking Directive prohibits undertakings other than credit institutions from carrying on the business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public. While the Consolidated Banking Directive does not define deposit-taking, the concept of ‘deposits or other repayable funds’ under that Directive has been broadly interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which has noted that ‘the term “other repayable funds” […] refers not only to financial instruments which possess the intrinsic characteristic of repayability, but also to those which, although not possessing that characteristic, are the subject of a contractual agreement to repay the funds paid’ (4). It does not matter whether such funds are received in the form of deposits or in other forms, such as ‘the continuing issue of bonds and other comparable securities’ (5), as referred to in a forerunner of the Consolidated Banking Directive. Thus, ‘all receipts of monies may amount to deposit-taking business (in the broader sense) if they involve repayment of the monies received. It is unimportant in this regard whether the requirement of repayment already exists at the time the funds are received (and forms an “essential” element of that transaction), or whether this obligation only arises as a result of the creation of a contractual entitlement’ (6). A proper interpretation of deposit-taking ‘will have to be guided by the question of the range of the savings to be protected and the interpretation of the characteristics of “credit business” in the light of the risks considered significant in terms of the protection of recovery of deposits. The outcome is a tendency towards a broad interpretation both of deposit-taking business and credit’ (7).

3.2

In view of the above, it would appear that payment institutions will in fact receive deposits from their customers. If this is the case, then, as a general matter, if the payment institution became insolvent, any funds it held at the moment of insolvency would form part of its estate, and would thus be available to meet the claims of all of its creditors. The activity of receiving deposits or other repayable funds is at the heart of the concept of banking itself, as is made clear in the definition of ‘credit institution’ laid down in Article 1(1)(a) of the Consolidated Banking Directive (8). Altering the fundamental concept of banking requires careful consideration from the perspectives of monetary policy, the soundness and safety of payment systems, financial stability and statistics, all of which are matters in relation to which the ESCB has extensive competences. The activities of payment institutions inevitably include holding funds of the public, even if only for a limited period of time. Consumer protection and financial stability issues must therefore be taken into consideration when establishing supervisory requirements and safeguards for such activities.

4.1

Overall, the proposed directive would allow payment institutions to operate under a lighter supervisory regime than that applicable under the Consolidated Banking Directive. Besides an authorisation procedure based on some qualitative requirements, payment institutions would have to comply with a regulatory framework, which would: (i) mainly be based on a number of generally drafted disclosure requirements; and (ii) not include capital requirements against quantifiable risks (see Article 5 of the proposed directive). The light supervisory regime raises some concerns, which are accentuated by the fact that the proposed directive prescribes full harmonisation (see Article 78 of the proposed directive) in contrast to the regulatory approach taken in other Community legislation governing the taking up and pursuit of the business of providing financial services.

4.2

The ECB is of the view that there is scope for improvement in the regulatory treatment of payment institutions under the proposed directive in three main areas. First, the unclear distinction between payment institutions and other payment service providers makes it extremely difficult to assess risks and the related safeguards. This is the case not only if and insofar as payment institutions may hold funds that are difficult to distinguish from deposits, but also with regard to their ability to grant credit financed by money received from the public (see paragraph 4 of the Annex to the proposed directive). Second, the proposed directive does not address the different categories of risks associated with payment services. In this respect, it is worth recalling that payment services performed by credit institutions will be made subject to specific capital requirements as a result of the operational risk attaching to such services (9). Third, it may also be argued that the authorisation procedure laid down in the proposed directive is based on criteria which leave too much room for different interpretations at national level. Member States may also waive some of the authorisation requirements under certain circumstances (10).

4.3

In view of these considerations, there seems to be a mismatch under the proposed directive between the scope of activities of payment institutions and the prudential framework within which such activities are to be carried out. Once the actual scope of payment institutions' activities has been clarified, the imposition of adequate capital requirements and/or other similar safeguards (e.g. initial capital requirements, guarantees) should be considered on the basis of an assessment of the related risks.

4.4

The absence of capital requirements for payment institutions could potentially provide scope for supervisory arbitrage. Regardless of whether credit institutions perform their payments business directly or through subsidiaries qualifying as payment institutions, they will be subject to supervision on a consolidated basis for operational risks as well as credit risks. Conversely, stand-alone payment institutions or payment institutions that are not part of a banking group will not be subject to any capital requirements despite carrying on the same business.

4.5

Moreover, the proposed directive is generally unclear with regard to the respective responsibilities of the home and host Member States' competent authorities. One example of this is the third paragraph of Article 6 of the proposed directive, which regulates the granting of European passports to payment institutions without making it clear which competent authority of which Member State will be in charge of supervising such payment institutions. It would be worthwhile considering these issues more carefully.

4.6

In applying Article 15 of the proposed directive, the competences of the ESCB and of national central banks with respect to the smooth operation of payment systems and, in those Member States where applicable, the competences of national central banks in the field of supervision should be duly respected.

4.7

The supervisory powers of the competent authorities under Article 16 of the proposed directive could be made clearer in a number of respects. First, the scope of ‘on-site inspections’ (Article 16(b)) could be more precisely specified. Second, the exact meaning of the power to impose ‘proportionate penalties’ (Article 16(d)) could also be clarified. Third, the conditions for suspension and withdrawal of an authorisation (Article 16(e)) could be defined, possibly by means of a separate provision. In order to achieve a sufficient level playing field within the European area and sufficient efficiency in the supervision of institutions benefiting from free establishment and free provision of services, Article 16 of the proposed directive should be amended to ensure that all competent authorities have all the powers provided for by this Article, in particular supervisory and enforcement abilities.

4.8

Article 19 of the proposed directive provides for Member States to allow exchanges of information between their competent authorities, central banks, the ESCB and the ECB. While this provision is, in principle, welcome, it is suggested that if the competent authority is an entity other than the central bank, and the latter is also the payment system overseer, it should be complemented by other provisions stipulating that: (i) prior to granting or suspending/withdrawing a licence, the competent authority has to consult the relevant central bank; and (ii) competent authorities are obliged to share information with the relevant central bank. Such provisions would be beneficial, given the overall responsibility of central banks in the field of payments.

5.1

If payment institutions are allowed to hold funds which in both economic and legal terms qualify as deposits, although conceptually not characterised as such under the proposed directive, the level of risk will be equal to that of credit or e-money institutions. Accordingly, the level of safeguards should be the same as that applied to credit and/or e-money institutions. It follows that payment services should preferably be restricted to credit or e-money institutions. This would ensure sufficient protection of customer funds and sound financial activity, and is therefore the ECB's preferred approach.

5.2

If the level of safeguards imposed on credit and/or e-money institutions is also established for payment institutions, then Title II of the proposed directive would need to be fundamentally redrafted.

6.1

If the category of lightly-supervised payment institutions is introduced, as proposed by the Commission, the proposed directive should be amended to make it clear that payment institutions should not be allowed to keep payment service users' funds for longer than the limited time period during which they are being transferred from payer to payee, nor should they be allowed to reinvest such funds. The current wording of Article 10(2) of the proposed directive could otherwise lead to the conclusion that the opening of accounts by payment institutions in their books implies that the funds received could be reinvested for the benefit of the payment institution. Such a clarification could be achieved, for example, by restricting the payment service activities of payment institutions to those specified in paragraph 7 of the Annex to the proposed directive. The activity specified in paragraph 5 of the Annex could also be ascribed to payment institutions pending, however, clarification that the activity of issuing cards is linked to a requirement for the cardholder's account to be held with a credit institution. Moreover, payment institutions should not be allowed to grant credit in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Annex to the proposed directive.

6.2

Furthermore, to avoid any diverging interpretation, it might be useful to indicate which services may be offered by which type of institution, regrouping all paragraphs of the Annex to the proposed directive as follows: (i) paragraphs 1-7: credit institutions; (ii) paragraphs 1-3 and 5-7: e-money institutions; and (iii) paragraph 7: payment institutions. In addition, as mentioned above, the activity specified in paragraph 5 of the Annex could possibly also be considered as an activity provided by payment institutions (11). The same may hold true for the activity specified in paragraph 4 of the Annex, if it is ensured that funds received from payment service users to provide payment services cannot be deployed to extend credit to other payment service users.

6.3

Other minimum safeguards could be considered to protect payment service users' funds. For example, in the context of certain specific futures-clearing arrangements, cash placed by customers with futures-clearing brokers is construed under the laws of certain Member States (e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom) and of the United States as being the property of the customer rather than as being a cash deposit. This arrangement is often provided for by specific legislation or is confirmed by case-law. Without addressing the proprietary nature of such cash, which might raise difficulties under the laws of some Member States, one option would be to develop the safeguards contained in Article 10(2) of the proposed directive obliging payment institutions to keep the payment service users' funds separate in their books. This could be done by amending the proposed directive to ensure that more explicit obligations are imposed on payment institutions as follows: (i) to earmark funds accepted to specific transactions; (ii) to segregate funds accepted for a payment transaction from other funds accepted for activities other than payment services and record them separately in payment institutions' books; (iii) to keep payment service users' funds under an account name which clearly identifies them as such; (iv) not to commingle payment service users' funds with the funds of the payment service provider or any other payment service user or person; (v) to insulate payment service users' funds from any third-party action against the payment institution; (vi) if a payment institution becomes insolvent, to return payment service users' funds promptly and in priority to all other claims; and (vii) where insufficient funds are available for remittance to payment service users of an insolvent payment institution, to distribute the remaining funds to the payment service users on a pro rata basis in accordance with the principal amount of their respective claims.

6.4

Furthermore, the reference in Article 10(1)(b) of the proposed directive to ancillary services such as ‘the guaranteeing execution of payment transactions’ requires further explanation, to make it clear that such services are only for the benefit of the payment services users taking part in the transaction.

6.5

Finally, Article 10(3) of the proposed directive states that the activities of payment institutions are not to be restricted to offering payment services subject to applicable national and Community law. This implies that the range of activities of payment institutions may go beyond those listed in the Annex to the proposed directive, which gives rise to two concerns. First, the proposed directive does not list all types of activities allowed. A full assessment of these activities from the point of view of consumer protection and financial stability can only be made if all possible activities are known. Second, if such activities are based on national law, then the purpose of the proposed directive, namely to ensure full harmonisation, will not be achieved. For these reasons, Article 10(3) of the proposed directive should be deleted.

7.1

The banking industry is currently working intensively on services that will meet the demands of the SEPA. As early as 1 January 2008, the industry aims to offer pan-European payment instruments to citizens, authorities and commercial enterprises for both national and cross-border payments. Creation of the SEPA could however be problematic within the current Community legal framework, given the diversity of applicable national legislation. Harmonisation of the legal framework for payments is therefore important, as it will assist the banking industry in its efforts to establish the SEPA. The SEPA-relevant parts of the proposed directive (largely Titles III and IV) appear to be less controversial than Title II. If adoption of the proposed directive is delayed owing to ambiguities described above, the implementation of the SEPA might also be delayed. In order to prevent such a delay, therefore, it would be beneficial to carve Title II out of the proposed directive. However, such a carve-out should be conditional on making payment institutions subject to separate Community legislation in due course. In this respect, the role of payment institutions could logically be discussed in the context of the planned review of the E-money Directive in order to achieve a consistent regulatory and supervisory framework for different categories of payment service providers.

7.2

Another possibility might be for the Governing Council of the ECB to adopt an ECB regulation under Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 22 of the Statute which would govern the specific SEPA-related provisions of the proposed directive that fall within the ESCB's fields of competence, while recognising, however, that not all provisions facilitating SEPA could be adopted on this basis.

7.3

A specific SEPA-related issue concerns the maximum execution time of ‘D+1’, as provided for in Article 60(1) and Article 61(1) of the proposed directive. It is expected that the majority of payment service providers could fulfil this requirement by 1 January 2010. However, it must be kept in mind that the industry has not been consulted on the consequences of the requirement of ‘D+1’ and that some banking communities might have difficulties complying in time.

9.1

The proposed directive should make it clear that payment system operators will be entitled to differentiate between different types of payment service providers regarding the conditions to be fulfilled before the latter can gain access to payment systems. This should be done on objective grounds, with the aim of managing the risks associated with payment service providers. In addition, the scope of Article 23(1) of the proposed directive should be limited to ensuring non-discriminatory access of payment institutions to payment systems. Article 23(1) of the proposed directive should be amended accordingly.

9.2

It is understood that the intention of Article 23(2) of the proposed directive is to exempt systems designated under the Settlement Finality Directive (13) from the access conditions under Article 23(1). However, the wording is not sufficiently clear in this respect, and a straightforward exemption is suggested.

9.3

Furthermore, the proposed directive should make it clear that the provision of clearing and settlement services is subject to oversight standards established by the Eurosystem, in accordance with Article 105(2) of the Treaty. This could be achieved, for example, by amending recital 12 to the proposed directive and Article 23(2) accordingly. In this respect, the Eurosystem will, in connection with its task of promoting the smooth operation of euro area payment systems, consider whether the participation of payment institutions in payment systems is sufficiently safe and does not imply undue risks for the stability of the financial system.

9.4

Finally, Article 10(1)(c) of the proposed directive grants payment institutions an explicit right to operate payment systems. As Community legislation currently neither defines the concept of ‘payment system operator’ nor regulates the legal nature of such operators, there is no need to introduce a right for payment institutions (or any other category of payment service provider governed by the proposed directive) to operate payment systems. In the same vein, the reference to ‘operation of payment systems’ in the title and first paragraph of Article 23 of the proposed directive should be deleted.

11.1

The scope of the proposed directive, as set out in Articles 2 and 3, may result in some differences of interpretation. Under Article 2, the proposed directive applies to an exhaustive list of business activities defined as payment services and listed in the Annex to the proposed directive. Under Article 3, it also contains what seems to be an exhaustive list of exemptions from the proposed directive, although it could be useful to clarify this point. In order to make the relationship between Articles 2 and 3 of the proposed directive clearer, the ECB suggests replacing the current heading of Article 3 with the term ‘exemptions’.

11.2

In addition, some of the items governed by Article 3 are problematic. First, the proposed directive does not seem to be technologically neutral, as it discriminates between physical and electronic forms of payment. It may therefore create an unwarranted bias towards paper-based payment services. Depending on existing national legislation, payment service providers that currently offer paper-based services might find it more costly to introduce more efficient electronic versions of their products, as they would then fall under the proposed directive, which might therefore delay the generally desirable introduction of electronic payment services.

11.3

Second, the waiver for certain payment services provided by providers of telecommunications, IT systems or networks, as outlined in Article 3(j) of the proposed directive, may be prone to different interpretations. The provision is not technologically neutral and may be interpreted either too narrowly or too widely (e.g. payments on online trading platforms such as eBay might be excluded, although they are not materially different from services that would fall under the proposed directive). As a result the proposed directive could be implemented unevenly. Moreover, the relationship between the waiver and paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Annex to the proposed directive is not fully clear. As a result the ECB suggests that Article 3(j) of the proposed directive and paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Annex thereto should be deleted altogether.

11.4

To the extent that paper-based promissory notes are referred to in Article 3(f) of the proposed directive, a general reference should also be made to bills of exchange, including both bills of exchange covered by the 1930 Geneva Convention (14) and bills of exchange that are not.

12.1

The proposed directive follows two different approaches when laying down definitions. In some cases definitions are established by means of specific provisions in Article 4, while in other cases definitions are dispersed throughout different parts of the proposed directive (e.g. in Article 1 (‘credit institutions’, ‘electronic money institutions’, ‘post office giro institutions’ and ‘payment institutions’), Article 2 (‘payment services’ and ‘payment transaction’), Article 29 (‘framework contracts’), and Article 51 (‘micro enterprises’)). It is suggested that all definitions could be contained in a single definitions article of the proposed directive, which could be the first article. This would be similar to the approach taken in the Consolidated Banking Directive.

12.2

At the same time, there is an issue of consistency with definitions and concepts used in existing Community law, e.g. the SFD. For instance, this is the case for the definition of ‘payment system’ in Article 4(3) of the proposed directive, which should be made compatible with the concept of a ‘system’ as used in the SFD, given the potential interaction between systems designated under the SFD and other payment systems. Further consistency could be achieved by introducing into the proposed directive the definitions of ‘payer’ and ‘payee’ contained in Article 3 of the proposed regulation on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds (15).

12.3

The concept of ‘payment institution’ should be amended to exclude the possibility that natural persons may act as payment institutions, since this would give rise to the risk that the funds of the payment institution could be commingled with those of the natural person concerned.

12.4

The concept of ‘payment account’ contained in Article 4(7) of the proposed directive is unclear. This should be remedied, as it is key to interpreting the concept of payment services and the scope of payment institutions' activity. As currently drafted, it is not clear if all categories of payment service providers may provide payment accounts. If payment institutions are to be permitted to provide payment accounts, the differences between ‘conventional’ bank accounts and payment accounts have to be clarified. Furthermore, the characteristics of such accounts need to be clearly defined. The questions that arise in this context relate to who is entitled to provide such accounts, who may hold them and what their legal nature and effects are.

12.5

Another issue that needs clarification is what is meant by the reference in the definition of payment account to the account being ‘used exclusively for payment transactions’. Does this, for example, exclude the possibility of interest-bearing accounts or keeping funds for a longer time than is strictly necessary for the transaction? It must also be ensured that payment institutions may not pay interest or provide other incentives to the account holder.

12.6

The definition of ‘funds’ contained in Article 4(8) of the proposed directive should be redrafted by, inter alia, replacing the word ‘cash’ with a reference to banknotes and coins.

12.7

In relation to the definition of ‘unique identifier’ contained in Article 4(15) of the proposed directive, it is recalled that ECB Opinion CON/2005/56 of 15 December 2005 on a proposal for an EC regulation on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds (16) proposes specific wording for the definition of ‘unique identifier’, which now appears to be reflected in the current version of the proposed regulation. It is suggested that the definition of 'unique identifier' in both the proposed regulation and the proposed directive should be harmonised.

12.8

The concept of ‘execution time’ is used in various recitals to the proposed directive and in Articles 26(1)(a)(ii) and 31(1)(b)(ii), Article 35 and Section 2 of Chapter 2 of Title IV, without being defined. Defining the execution time as a specific time-span (which could be measured, for instance, in working days or operating hours) would be beneficial as it would enable the maximum execution time to be defined. Moreover, there are many transactions that are effected without the use of a payment account (e.g. money remittances to non-banking customers). The definition of execution time in the proposed directive should also cover such cases.

12.9

There is no common calendar of ‘working days’ in the EU, and, although the term is also applied throughout Section 2 of Chapter 2 of Title IV of the proposed directive, it is not defined. For processing and operating purposes, and to ensure that the scope of obligations is clear, it would be useful to insert such a definition into the proposed directive (in the definitions article).

12.10

The term ‘scriptural money’ is used in the proposed directive without being defined, e.g. in Article 3(b), Article 4(8) of the proposed directive and paragraph 7 of the Annex to the proposed directive. It is suggested that a definition of scriptural money should be established (in the definitions article), bearing in mind that only central banks and credit institutions (which include e-money institutions) may hold such funds.

12.11

In the same vein, the term ‘branch’ is used in Article 4(2) and Article 20 of the proposed directive without being defined. It is suggested that a definition of ‘branch’ should be introduced in line with the definition in Article 1(3) of the Consolidated Banking Directive.

12.12

The definition of ‘framework contract’ should be moved from Article 29 to the definitions article. Moreover, for reasons of consistency, the term ‘framework contract’ should be used throughout the proposed directive, replacing the alternative term ‘framework agreement’ used in recital 18 to the proposed directive and in Articles 32 and 33.

13.1

It needs to be clarified whether host Member States may, for statistical reporting purposes, require that all payment institutions having branches within their territories report on their activities to the competent statistical authorities of the host Member State, inter alia, the national central bank and/or the national statistical agency.

13.2

It could be explicitly clarified that the reference to ‘any currency’ in Article 2 of the proposed directive is intended to apply to the currencies of countries outside the Community.

13.3

Article 1 of the proposed directive is entitled ‘Subject matter’ and should accordingly be restricted to a basic presentation of the proposed directive's subject matter. It would seem more appropriate for the four categories of payment service providers to come under a single definition of ‘payment service provider’ to be included in the definitions article, especially given that the definitions article also defines the concept of a payment service user.

13.4

Article 11(2) of the proposed directive concerning the use of tied agents, outsources or subsidiaries refers to outsourcing of ‘all operations’. This is problematic, as it would allow the creation of shell companies that formally comply with the proposed directive, while the actual operations are performed by a third party that is not subject to its requirements. The ECB therefore suggests amending Article 11 to avoid such implications.

13.5

Article 12(1) of the proposed directive refers to ‘operational risk’ without defining this concept. The necessary precision could be provided by applying the definition of ‘operational risk’ contained in Article 4(22) of the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive (17).

13.6

The record-keeping rules contained in Articles 13 and 44 of the proposed directive might imply that a payment institution's record-keeping obligations do not extend for longer than one year. These obligations should be brought more explicitly in line with other Community legislation, such as Article 30 of the Third Money Laundering Directive (18), which lays down a minimum record-keeping obligation of five years.

13.7

The concept of ‘consent’ contained in Article 41 of the proposed directive is not precise enough. Reference to withdrawal of consent and a definition thereof are necessary in this context.

13.8

The wording of Article 52 of the proposed directive concerning refunds is ambiguous, for example referring to entitlement to a refund where the amount of the transaction executed is not an amount ‘that a reasonable payer would expect if he were in the payer's position’. This wording leaves wide room for interpretation, which increases uncertainty in the payments field, and could lead to an increase in disputes and leave consumers unprotected. In order to minimise the risk of future litigation, further consideration should therefore be given to clarifying the wording of Article 52.

13.9

Finality of a payment is crucial for the payee, and therefore the concept of ‘being informed’ contained in Article 53(1) of the proposed directive is too vague, as the timing could differ significantly where the information becomes accessible via the payer's internet bank or a publicly-available account printer, as opposed to cases where the payer receives a hard-copy account statement by post. A fixed moment in time relating to the transfer itself would therefore be preferable. To allow the payer additional time to react, the permitted time frame could be extended from four to six weeks.

13.10

The concepts of ‘acceptance’ and of ‘irrevocability’ contained in Article 54 and 56 of the proposed directive, while being clear and helpful, should be compatible with the concepts of ‘entry into a system’ and ‘irrevocability’ in the SFD.

13.11

Article 54(2) of the proposed directive should be amended to ensure that the time lag between the receipt and acceptance of a payment is not unnecessarily prolonged.

13.12

Article 65(1) of the proposed directive concerning availability of funds states that Member States must ensure that payment service providers of the payee make funds available to the payee as soon as these funds are credited to the account of the payee. It would seem obvious that funds are available once credited to the payee's account. Therefore it would seem appropriate to make it clear that funds are to be made available to the payee immediately once the payment service provider has received them.

13.13

To enable payment schemes to allow efficient straight-through processing, Article 66(1) of the proposed directive should be amended by inserting a reference to the International Bank Account Number (IBAN) as the preferred unique identifier in all cases, thereby ensuring a harmonised approach in the use of unique identifiers.